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RULES AGAINST RULIFICATION
Michael Coenen*
Abstract: The Supreme Court often confronts the choice between bright-line rules and openended standards—a point well understood by commentators and the Court itself. Far less
understood is a related choice that arises once the Court has opted for a standard over a rule:
May lower courts develop subsidiary rules to facilitate their own application of the Supreme
Court’s standard, or must they always apply that standard in its pure, un-“rulified” form? In
several recent cases, spanning a range of legal contexts, the Court has endorsed the latter
option, fortifying its first-order standards with second-order “rules against rulification.”
Rules against rulification are a curious breed: They promote the use of standards, but only in a
categorical, rule-like manner. The existing literature on the rules-standards dilemma thus sheds
only limited light on the special problems that anti-rulification rules present. This Article
addresses these problems head-on, disentangling the (often unintuitive) consequences that result
from the Court’s adoption of anti-rulification rules, while also offering practical suggestions as
to when and how these rules should be deployed. Overall, the Article’s take is qualifiedly
negative: Anti-rulification rules, while useful in some circumstances, carry the undesirable and
often unnecessary consequence of cutting lower courts out of the lawmaking loop. And that in
turn impedes the Court’s own ability to refine and develop its standards over time. The Court
should therefore pronounce rules against rulification only sparingly, and lower courts should
identify them only begrudgingly.
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................................... 2
THE POSSIBILITY OF ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES................................................................................... 6

I.
A.
B.
C.
D.

Rules, Standards, and Specificity ........................................................................................................................... 6
The Rulification Process ........................................................................................................................................... 7
Rules Against Rulification ...................................................................................................................................... 10
Subtleties, Nuances, Etc.......................................................................................................................................... 12

A.
B.
C.

The Supreme Court’s Commands ........................................................................................................................ 13
The Lower Courts’ Responses .............................................................................................................................. 17
The Alternative Approach ...................................................................................................................................... 20

THE REALITY OF ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES.................................................................................. 13

II.

III.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

IV.
A.

THE LIMITED VALUE OF ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES .................................................................... 24
Experimentation ........................................................................................................................................................ 25
Downward Delegation ............................................................................................................................................ 27
Deliberation ................................................................................................................................................................ 29
Transparency.............................................................................................................................................................. 30
Conclusion: Minimalism Redux? ......................................................................................................................... 30

WORKING WITH ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES .................................................................................. 32
Creating Anti-Rulification Rules .......................................................................................................................... 32

*

Assistant Professor, LSU Law Center. For valuable comments, criticisms, and suggestions, I thank Anna ArkinGallagher, Bill Corbett, Dan Coenen, Seth Davis, Richard Fallon, Jeremy Golubcow-Teglasi, Mike Klarman, Ashley
Lott, Christopher Sherman, and Susannah Barton Tobin. Thanks also to C.J. Murray for invaluable research
assistance. All errors are mine.

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2388927

Separating Substance from Methodology .................................................................................................... 32
Practicing What One Preaches ......................................................................................................................... 34
B. Detecting Anti-Rulification Rules ........................................................................................................................ 36
1. Thresholds of Clarity .......................................................................................................................................... 36
2. Dicta Versus Holding? ....................................................................................................................................... 37
1.
2.

V.
A.
B.
C.

VARIATIONS ON THE THEME ................................................................................................................. 40
Pro-Rulification Rules ............................................................................................................................................. 40
Anti-Rulification Standards ................................................................................................................................... 41
Anti-Publication Rules ............................................................................................................................................ 42

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................................... 43
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court often faces a choice between bright-line rules and open-ended
standards. That is, with what degree of specificity should the Court enunciate controlling
principles of doctrine? The tradeoffs are familiar. With rules, the Court can buy itself
uniformity, predictability, and low decision costs, at the expense of rigidity, inflexibility, and
arbitrary-seeming outcomes. With standards, it can buy itself nuance, flexibility, and casespecific deliberation, at the expense of uncertainty, variability, and high decision costs.1 Every
case that reaches the Court’s docket presents some version of this design dilemma, and every
opinion the Court issues reflects some determination as to where on the rules-standard spectrum
its holding ought to lie.
The choice between rules and standards sometimes accompanies a second choice, which
arises once the Court has opted for a standard over a rule. Having articulated a governing
standard, should the Court permit future rule-like elaborations on the substance of the standard,
or should it require that lower courts apply the standard in its pure, unadulterated form? Put
differently, should the Court adopt a permissive standard, whose application may be assisted by
the development of ancillary rules, or a mandatory standard, fortified by a rule against
rulification.
Florida v. Harris illustrates this choice.2 The case involved the Florida Supreme Court’s
application of the Fourth Amendment probable cause test, which, as defined by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, permits searches based on “a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’”3 The Florida court in Harris had
held that a police dog’s detection of drug odors did not create probable cause to search the
defendant’s vehicle, reasoning that the dog lacked the requisite credentials to indicate a “fair
probability” of contraband under Gates. In so holding, the court identified several criteria for
evaluating the drug detection credentials of canine cops: Among other things, it held that the
government bore the burden of adducing “the dog’s training and certification records, an
explanation of the meaning of the particular training and certification, field performance records
1

See infra note ?.
133 S. Ct. 1050.
3
462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Rather than tether probable cause to the presence of precise, outcome-determinative
criteria, the Court endorsed a “totality-of-the-circumstances” inquiry, governed by a “practical, common-sense
decision whether . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.” Id.
2
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(including any unverified alerts), and evidence concerning the experience and training of the
officer handling the dog.”4 Applying this highly specific minimum-showing requirement, the
state court went on to hold that the search lacked probable cause, because the government never
produced the required records on behalf of the dog.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The lower court had erred, the Court
explained, by “creat[ing] a strict evidentiary checklist, whose every item the State must tick
off.”5 In this way, the state court had employed the “antithesis of a totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis,” not allowing evidentiary deficiencies as to a dog’s training credentials to “be
compensated for . . . by a strong showing as to . . . other indicia of reliability.”6 The “inflexible
checklist,” simply put, was not “the way to prove reliability.” The state court should have asked
the simpler question of whether “all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens
of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal
contraband or evidence of a crime.”7
The Supreme Court’s disapproval of the lower court’s decision thus encompassed not just
a substantive disagreement with the conclusion that the canine-initiated search lacked probable
cause, but also a methodological objection to the manner in which the court had performed its
analysis. The state court had applied a rule where a standard was required. Gates demanded a
particularized, case-by-case inquiry of canine-based searches; it did not permit the promulgation
of an across-the-board, outcome-determinative “checklist” approach for evaluating the drug
detection credentials of police dogs. Harris may thus be construed as adopting an antirulification rule, making clear that the Gates standard was mandatory rather than permissive as
applied to sniff-search probable cause review. In other words, lower courts were precluded from
building out the Gates standard by fashioning sub-rules that would objectify its operation in
particular categories of Fourth Amendment cases.
Rules against rulification are a curious breed. In one sense, they further many of the
benefits associated with standards writ large. They guard against overinclusive and
underinclusive doctrinal formulations and thereby promote fairness on an individualized basis.
They reduce the risk of legal obsolescence over time. They encourage case-specific deliberation
long associated with the common law method. And so on. At the same time, rules against
rulification are themselves rules, which limit lower court involvement in the shaping of Supreme
Court doctrine. When the Supreme Court promulgates a permissive standard, it invites lower
courts to adorn that standard with subsidiary rules; lower courts may (or may not) choose to fill
in the relevant gaps with bright-line boundaries, safe harbor presumptions, categorical
exceptions, multi-factor tests, and the like.8 In sharp contrast, mandatory standards produce
methodological rigidity at the lower court level, prohibiting downstream elaboration of a
standard’s open-ended terms except through narrow and case-specific holdings. In other words,
the Supreme Court enunciates a norm, the norm is a standard, and all that remains for lower
courts to do is to apply the standard without further specification as to what the standard entails.

4

Harris v. State, 71 So.3d 756, 775 (Fla. 2011).
Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056.
6
Id. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 233).
7
Id. at 1058.
8
The mechanics of this process (sometimes termed the “rulification of standards”) are further described in Frederick
Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803 (2004).
5
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The primary goal of this Article is to sketch out some criteria for evaluating the use of
rules against rulification and, accordingly, the choice between mandatory and permissive
standards. Having decided to offer the lower courts guidance in terms of a standard rather than a
rule, when should the Court take the further step of expressly prohibiting the lower courts from
rulifying the standard in future cases? At first glance, this question might seem to answer itself:
If the Supreme Court itself has opted for a standard over a rule, why would it ever wish for the
lower courts to translate the standard into rules? In fact, however, good reasons will often favor
just such an approach. In many circumstances, as this Article will show, the Court might
sensibly choose to define a norm in standard-like terms while still permitting lower courts to
flesh out some specifications of the standard in the form of general, bright-line rules.
By introducing the concept of anti-rulification rules and offering a preliminary appraisal
of their advantages and disadvantages, this Article aims to inform at least three ongoing areas of
scholarly inquiry. The first involves the rules-standards problem itself. From the legal realists
on down,9 courts and commentators have scrutinized many aspects of the choice between rules
and standards, focusing on their respective virtues and vices, their effects on individual conduct,
their relationship to formalist and functionalist modes of judging, and so on.10 While not
intervening directly in the longstanding rules-standards debate, this Article does shine some new
light on it, by suggesting how choices between rules and standards at the Supreme Court level
affect the development of the law within the lower courts that the Justices oversee. In particular,
the Article suggests that when standards are permissive rather than mandatory, proponents of
rules should sometimes be willing to tolerate (if not endorse) the adoption of such standards at
the Supreme Court level, because Supreme Court standards—unlike Supreme Court rules—leave
room for lower courts to experiment with rules. Put another way, a standard adopted at the
Supreme Court level need not translate into totality-of-the-circumstances review at the lower
court level in every case. And articulation of a standard by the Supreme Court—if permissive
rather than mandatory in nature—may facilitate the fashioning of a better set of rules.
The second area of relevant literature involves judicial minimalism. A minimalist court,
as Cass Sunstein has put it, “settles the case before it, but [] leaves many things undecided,”
avoiding in the meantime “clear rules and final resolutions” regarding issues that might benefit
from further contemplation among courts, other public officials, and private citizens.11 For this
reason, Professor Sunstein and other commentators have drawn parallels between the debate over
minimalism versus maximalism and the debate over rules versus standards: Compared to
standards, rules more severely constrain the resolution of future cases; consequently, minimalists
champion standards over rules in enunciating controlling propositions of law.12 This Article,
however, raises an important caveat regarding this jurisprudential stance. It suggests that
standards jibe with minimalism only when articulated in a way that permits the development of
follow-on rules. The Court does not further minimalist values when it foists a legal standard on
all future courts for all time, categorically prohibiting these courts from developing rules to assist
in their application of the standard. Rather, the truly minimalist opinion merely adopts a
standard for itself, leaving future courts free to decide whether the standard performs best in
rulified, semi-rulified, or non-rulified form. The key point is that the minimalist virtues of
9

ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 115-20 (1922).
See sources cited in note ? supra.
11
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT ix (1999).
12
See sources cited infra note ?.
10
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standards dissipate when rules against rulification enter the picture. It is only with permissive
standards that the Court can effectively “leaves things undecided.”
Finally, in describing and examining the Court’s many rules against rulification, I hope to
contribute to an emerging area of scholarly interest and debate: the role of the Supreme Court in
shaping and constraining the methodological choices of the courts within its purview. The
academic literature on this question has thus far focused on statutory interpretation, inquiring
into the possibility, reality, and desirability of according binding effect to various methods of
statutory interpretation. Scholars in this line of work have asked, for instance, whether the Court
does (or at least should) require future interpreters of a statute to employ textualism over
purposivism, eschew legislative history, or otherwise constrain the methods by which judges find
meaning in statutory text.13 While not asking these particular questions, the Article advances
ideas that may inform and enrich our answers to them, by drawing attention to a set of doctrines
through which the Court has unabashedly imposed methodological restraints on its subordinates.
The Court’s rules against rulification, that is, may help us understand the relationship between
methodology and precedent more generally. At the least, they raise the question whether the
Court’s willingness to impose methodological constraints on lower courts in applying doctrinal
standards sanctioned by the Court itself can be reconciled with its current unwillingness to do the
same when it comes to the interpretation of statutory commands.
The ensuing analysis proceeds in five Parts. Part I offers a conceptual overview of antirulification rules, explaining what they are and how they operate. Part II catalogues examples of
anti-rulification rules within several different areas of Supreme Court doctrine. In domains
ranging from the Fourth Amendment to the Takings Clause to intellectual property law to the
law of remedies, the Court has established limitations on the extent to which lower courts may
rulify substantive standards that the Court itself has laid down. With these examples on the
table, Part III turns to the question of why the Court creates rules against rulification and why it
sometimes might wish to avoid doing so. In particular, the analysis suggests that rules against
rulification make sense when the Court deems the value of fit to be of paramount importance in
applying law to fact. That is, when the overarching priority of a doctrinal formulation is to
minimize overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness, rules against rulification help to prevent
lower courts from undermining this priority by displacing the fuzzy penumbrae of a norm with
sharp and brittle edges. As Part III notes, however, prohibiting downstream rulification of a
standard presents problems of its own, which relate principally to the law’s development over
time. A major concern is that categorical bans on rulification foreclose valuable forms of
experimentation, deliberation, dialogue, and transparency concerning the optimal formulation of
a legal command. Put more simply, rules against rulification threaten to decide too much too
soon, thus undercutting the minimalist virtues that substantive standards would otherwise confer.
Part IV raises and address two follow-up questions regarding anti-rulification rules. First,
once the choice has been made to promulgate a rule against rulification, how should the Court go
about effectuating the command? Second, how can lower courts tell whether an anti-rulification
rule binds them? Here, I offer a variety of prescriptive suggestions. I posit, for instance, that the
Court must take care to divorce its methodological justification for a rule against rulification
from its substantive evaluation of the particular rulification that has come up for review. I also
suggest that lower courts should embrace a default presumption against the existence of rules
against rulification, thereby demanding a clear statement by the Justices when they seek to
13

See sources cited in note ? infra.
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propound a mandatory standard. But I also propose that when anti-rulification rules have been
clearly articulated by the Supreme Court, lower courts may not dismiss them as non-binding
dicta.
In Part V, I imagine variations on the theme of anti-rulification rules, speculating as to
other doctrinal formulations the Supreme Court might employ in attempting to control the
manner in which lower courts apply standards to individual cases. I consider, for example, the
possibility of “pro-rulification rules,” which expressly instruct the lower courts to rulify a
standard in whatever ways they deem fit. I also consider the possibility of “anti-rulification
standards,” which, in contrast to true rules against rulification, would merely discourage (but not
prohibit) the development of rules to assist in the application of Supreme Court standards.
Finally, I imagine the possibility of “anti-publication rules,” which would move even further in
the direction of anti-rulification rules, by prohibiting the development of any legal precedents at
all regarding a standard’s application to individual cases.
The reader expecting a firm, generalized, and (dare I say) rule-like conclusion regarding
rules against rulification will find no such thing in the analysis that follows. The reason why is
that rules against rulification admit of few easy conclusions; sometimes they should be used, and
other times they should not; and the difficult challenge thus becomes trying to identify the
considerations that weigh for and against their operation. That I cannot definitively endorse or
condemn such rules, however, does not mean that there remains nothing interesting to say about
them. This Article considers these matters, while taking care not to oversimplify the subject
under investigation. The most important point is that neither the Supreme Court nor the lower
courts can deal effectively with rules against rulification unless they recognize their existence
and appreciate their importance. For this reason, the Article seeks to remove these rules from the
shadows and bring them into the light.
I.
THE POSSIBILITY OF ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES
A.
Rules, Standards, and Specificity
What separates rules from standards?14 The distinction depends in large part on the
variable of specificity.15 The paradigmatic “rule” falls toward the high end of the specificity
spectrum; it ascribes definitive consequences to the satisfaction of precise and determinate
criteria.16 “Must be at least 5-feet tall to ride,” for instance, leaves little room for interpretation: if
you are at least 5-feet tall, you can go on the ride;17 if you are shorter than five feet, there is no
14

For a small sampling of the voluminous literature on rules and standards, see, for example, Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976); Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989);Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985);
Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term–Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
15
See, e.g., James J. Park, Rules, Principles and the Competition To Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CAL. L. REV.
115, 130 (2012) (“[R]ules and standards are primarily distinguished by their level of specificity. Rules are more
specific about what they require while standards tend to be more general.”)
16
In the words of Professor Sullivan, “[a] legal directive is “rule”-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a
determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts.” Sullivan, supra note ?, at 58.
17
Logically speaking, “must be at least 5-feet-tall to ride” establishes a necessary but not sufficient condition of
ride-worthiness. Literally read, that is, the rule would not necessarily preclude a ride administrator from prohibiting
admission to a 6-foot-tall individual deemed otherwise unfit to ride. I am assuming here, however, that the average
reader of the sign would apply to it the more commonsensical understanding that it guarantees ridership to all
individuals who are at least five feet tall.
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use waiting in line. The paradigmatic standard, by contrast, leaves many application-related
details unresolved.18 “Must be mature enough to ride,” for instance, offers only a hazy definition
of eligible riders. What does the rule mean by “mature”? Who counts as “mature enough”?
Many would-be riders cannot know in advance whether they will get to ride; they must await a
final decisionmaker’s judgment in order to find out whether they may step aboard.
Extreme examples of rules and standards are easy to create, but what about intermediate
cases? How, for instance, should we classify the command: “Must be approximately five-feet
tall (or taller) to ride.” That is less specific than the five-foot rule, but more specific than the
“mature enough” standard. Into what category, then, should it fall? One could ponder this
question at length, but doing so would not yield much of a payoff. “Rules” and “standards” are
not Platonic essences; rather, they are man-made concepts that facilitate our analysis of complex,
real-world phenomena. And for that reason, we need not (and probably should not) bother to
delineate a fixed point on the specificity spectrum that divides the realm of rules from the realm
of standards;19 the categories simply approximate something that is very much a matter of
degree.20
B.
The Rulification Process
With common law adjudication in motion, the initial pronouncement of a legal norm
marks only the beginning of its development. As cases begin to arise under the norm, courts
must decide whether a particular set of facts satisfies its triggering criteria. And by rendering
such decisions—which carry precedential force—courts inevitably elaborate upon the content of
the norm itself. To be sure, the extent of elaboration depends on the initial specificity of the
norm; for highly specific rules, such as the “at least five feet tall” requirement, repeated
determinations as to whether individuals do or do not exceed the five-foot minimum are not
likely to tell us a whole lot more about what the requirement itself entails. For less specific
standards, by contrast, common law adjudication stands ready to convert an open-ended

18

Again, in Professor Sullivan’s words, “[a] legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation.” Id.
19
See Frank Cross, Tonja Jacobi & Emerson Tiller, A Positive Political Theory of Rules and Standards, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 18 (“The ‘specificity-generality continuum’ may be treated, for simplification, as ‘a dichotomy between
‘rules’ and ‘standards.’” (quoting Isaach Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,
3 J. LEGAL. STUD. 257, 258 (1974))).
20
In identifying the rules and standards that emerge from judge-made doctrine, we must also take care to distinguish
between the “fact-specificity” of a Court’s analysis and the specificity of the guidance that the analysis produces.
These two variables often work at cross-purposes: fact-specific reasoning yields generalized (standard-like)
guidance, whereas generalized reasoning yields specific (and hence rule-like) guidance. Suppose, for instance, that
a court decides that a driver should be penalized because and only because she was exceeding a rate of 90 mph:
Abstracting away all other facets of the driver’s driving, that is, the court treats the single fact of the driver’s 90-plus
mph speed as reason enough to impose the penalty. That is an affirmatively non-fact-specific analysis, but what
emerges from it is the highly specific rule for future cases—namely, that driving in excess of 90 mph is categorically
illegal. If, by contrast, the Court had scrutinized multiple aspects of the particular driver’s conduct—including, but
not, isolating the rate of her speed—its opinion would have yielded less specific guidance for future decision-makers
to follow. If no one feature of the driver’s driving compelled the Court’s conclusion, then all that can be said for the
holding is that it seems to prohibit “unreasonable” driving, as judged by a comprehensive assessment of each
driver’s conduct. The relevant sense in which rules are more “specific” than standards, then, lies not in the degree to
which application of a norm must engage with the specifics of each case’s facts, but rather in the degree to which the
norm constrains its future appliers.
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pronouncement into a far more specific patchwork of rules. This is what I mean by the process
of “rulification.”21
Return again to the alternative “mature enough to ride” requirement. Pronounced in the
abstract, the requirement offers little guidance as to whether a given individual is eligible to
board the ride. To be sure, some applications of the rule can be immediately predicted: under
virtually all plausible interpretations of the “mature enough” rule, a newborn baby probably
cannot board the ride, whereas a mild-mannered middle-ager will pose no problem. But harder
cases will arise: What about an 8-year-old? A 10-year-old? Someone who seems physically
mature but not emotionally mature, or vice versa? Adjudicators will confront these sorts of
“boundary” cases and, by resolving them, offer important glosses on what the norm commands.
Suppose, for instance, that one application of the standard denies eligibility to a 12-year-old,
while another application grants eligibility to an otherwise similar 13-year-old. With these
applications in place—and exerting binding effect on future appliers of the standard—we may
now render more reliable predictions regarding further applications of the standard. We will
know, for instance, that being a teenager counts as a factor in favor of ride-worthiness maturity,
while being twelve or younger counts as a factor against. A future case might also hold that
anyone caught cutting in line in the theme park will be deemed too immature to satisfy the
“mature enough” standard. With that case decided, we know that line-cutters are per se
ineligible for a ride—even if other facts might militate the other way. As these holdings
continue to accrete, the judicially developed contours of the “mature enough” standard will
become more and more apparent.22 Eventually, anyone who digs into the relevant case law
21

This discussion draws on the work of Professor Mark D. Rosen, who to my knowledge is the first commentator to
describe the rulification process along these lines. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Modeling Constitutional Doctrine, 49
ST. LOUIS L.J. 691, 696 (2005) (noting that as standards are applied, they “almost always become[] increasingly rulelike,” and that “[t]his occurs because cases involv[e] particular facts” and “[a]s the cases are decided they become
showcases of what, as a concrete matter, the Legal Standard requires”); Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative
Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 479, 495-96 (2000) (“As the Standard is applied over a series of cases, it almost always becomes increasingly
rule-like. This occurs because cases, by nature, are disputes that involve particular facts. As the cases are decided
they become examples of what, as a concrete matter, the Standard means.”). Professor Frederick Schauer has also
written about the rulification phenomenon, although his focus is less on the sort of “natural” rulification process that
results from the accretion of judicial precedents, and more on conscious decisions to inject rule-like language into
the interstices that standards leave open. See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of
Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 805-06 (2005) (“Whether it be by importing rules from elsewhere, or
imposing rules of some sort on their own otherwise unconstrained decision-making, or filling decisional voids with
three- and four-part tests, interpreters and enforcers of standards have tried to convert those standards into rules to a
surprising degree . . .”); Mark Tushnet, The First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 103, 105
(2012) (noting the “tendency over time for courts to replace doctrine articulated in the form of standards with
doctrine articulated in the form of rules with exceptions”); see also Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis
Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1904 (2008) (noting that “courts frequently
engage in what Frederick Schauer has called the ‘rulification’ of standards, developing sub-principles that guide
their application of standards.”). It is these more conscious attempts at rulification that anti-rulification rules are
most likely to prevent. See Section I.C, infra.
22
As Professor Schauer has described the process:
Interpretations continuously change the options available to subsequent interpreters, thus
occasionally making quite precise clauses more open ended in practice but more often making
even the most open ended clauses substantially less so. For example, given the almost infinite
number of inequalities inherent in all legislation, the range of permissible applications of the equal
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should be able to translate the initially articulated standard into a rule-like formulation. And
courts will have accomplished this result without ever having purported to amend or revise the
standard itself. It is simply through the process of applying the norm to case after case that
courts nudge the norm up the specificity spectrum and thereby increase its rule-like character.
This process of “rulifying” a standard is entirely proper; indeed, it is a natural and recurring
consequence of issuing opinions with precedential effect.
The same cannot be said, however, when judges attempt the opposite feat—that is, by
“standard-ifying” a previously adopted rule. Suppose, for instance, that the “five-feet or taller”
requirement is in effect; according to this rule, all persons who are at least five-feet tall are
categorically eligible for the ride and all persons who fall below the threshold are categorically
ineligible for the ride. If a judge attempts to standard-ify this rule—by say, creating an exception
for “approach five feet in height and are able to handle the demands of the ride”, or by clarifying
that riders need only be “reasonably tall”—he or she can no longer claim fidelity to the operative
law.23 Why? Because by rendering the rule less specific than it previously was, the judge
necessarily creates law that conflicts with the original rule’s doctrinal commands. Rather than
clear up an uncertainty that a norm leaves open, the standard-ification process introduces
substantive outcomes that the norm had previously closed off. The five-feet-tall-to-ride rule, for
example, logically implies that no four-foot-eleven persons may board the ride; with the new,
standard-ified command in place, however, some four-foot-eleven persons can make it on board.
Rulifying standards adds paint to a blank canvass; standard-ifying rules removes paint that was
already there.
The upshot of all this is that unlike the rulification of standards, the standard-ification of
rules may be accomplished only by someone authorized to overrule the rule itself.24 Under our
protection clause, based on the text alone, is vast. As subsequent interpretations have limited the
number of classifications that occasion meaningful equal protection scrutiny, however, the
linguistic frame of the text alone has been substantially reduced in size, and therefore the size of
the field within the frame has also been reduced.
Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 435 (1985).
23
This is not, to be clear, to argue that the “standard-ification” of rules cannot occur. Indeed, the phenomenon
occurs all the time, as several scholars have documented. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note ?, at 804 (“From the
American Legal Realists to the present, legal theorist[s] have devoted some attention to the ways in which
seemin[g]ly crisp rules may have their edges rounded upon application, interpretation, or enforcement.”). My point
is merely that, within an operating legal hierarchy, only the highest-ranking court within the hierarchy may
“standard-ify” the rules it has promulgated, whereas both that court and its lower-ranking subordinates may “rul-ify”
its standards.
24
Few doctrinal commands are as absolute as the ones I have posited here. Even norms that would strike most of us
as “rules” sometimes contain a safety valve for cases where hard-and-fast adherence to the rule would otherwise
yield absurd or unjust results. Relatedly, some might argue that even the most absolute doctrinal commands remain
subordinate to a global, superseding norm that always permits courts to soften the edges of a categorical rule when
circumstances so warrant. On this view, the standard-ification of a rule need not amount to a changing of the rule
itself; rather, standard-ifying rules simply applies features of the doctrine already in place. When accused of
amending or repealing a categorical rule, that is, the standard-ifying judge might simply reply: “The law always
permitted me to do this, because the law has never tolerated total absoluteness in its doctrinal commands.”
But even if there exists a conception of the law under which courts can standard-ify rules without
overruling prior precedents, the key point for our purposes is that this move will generally require a higher
justificatory burden than a move in the inverse direction. However we characterize the standard-ification of rules—
whether involving the alteration of existing precedent, the utilization of implicit safety valves built into a rule, the
invocation of superseding principles of equity, and so forth—the process requires a judge to acknowledge that a
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system of vertical stare decisis, this point matters a great deal. It means that the doctrinal
development of norms in the lower courts may move only in the direction of more specificity,
not less. A court might, for instance, permissibly declare that the “five-foot tall” rule requires
measurements that include the height of a would-be rider’s shoes, it might require that the
controlling measurement occur within 60 days of the ride, and so on. But these holdings render
the rule more specific, not less. Any attempt, by contrast, to standard-ify the rule—by
introducing, for example, the possibility of some eligible four-foot-eleven riders—can succeed
only when the decisionmaker carries the further authority to change the rule.25 Under a strict
stare decisis regime, then, highly specific rules are intrinsically invulnerable to standard-ification
by any court subordinate to the rule’s promulgator, whereas not-so-specific standards can always
be further rulified in these subordinate courts. As a result, if the creator of a standard wants to
prevent rulification, she must do something more than simply articulate the standard itself.
C.
Rules Against Rulification
What, then, might superior courts do to prevent rulification of their standards by
subordinate tribunals? The answer is to fortify the standard with a supplemental command
regarding the method with which to apply it. In the same way that a superior court demands
adherence to the substantive standard it has adopted (e.g., “must be mature enough to ride”), it
might also require applying that standard in a way that does not produce a body of ancillary
rules. Returning to our hypothetical, for instance, the creator of the “mature enough to ride”
standard might stipulate that the maturity of a given rider must be evaluated on an individualized,
case-by-case basis, without reliance on generalizations, presumptions, per se exemptions, and the
like. Higher courts could also strike down lower court precedents that have taken the doctrine
too far up the specificity spectrum, identifying error in overly-broad reasoning that conveys too
much information as to the content of the standard itself. Any sort of command along these lines
would qualify as a “rule against rulification”; the creator of the standard not only prescribes a
substantive standard for future courts to apply, but it also takes the further step of instructing
future courts not to rulify the standard when applying it to concrete cases.
At this point, an important question should emerge: Won’t anti-rulification efforts always
prove futile in the end? After all, as originally described, rulification occurs as a natural
byproduct of courts deciding cases; the more cases the courts decide, the more data we acquire
regarding the standard’s scope and substance. The inevitable consequence of this process is an
increasingly specific set of guidelines regarding when the standard will come out in one’s favor,
doctrinal framework has become too constrictive and thus requires a reduction in constrictiveness. Such express
methodological tinkering need not (and often does not) occur when courts rulify standards; rulification, unlike
standard-ification, arises as a mere byproduct of a court’s substantive reasoning—in general, adding a precedent
regarding the application of law to fact provides more information (and hence increased specificity) regarding the
law’s application in future cases. The “natural” direction of doctrinal development, in other words, is in the
direction of more and more specificity regarding the content of a legal norm. The rulifier of standards comfortably
drifts along with this current, whereas the standard-ifier of rules has to figure out a way to swim upstream.
25
One further clarification: nothing in the foregoing analysis should be read to suggest that lower courts cannot
reduce the specificity of rules that they themselves have rendered. Only its own internal rules of stare decisis stand
in the way of subsequent lower court attempts to undo their own attempts at rulification. Thus, for instance, if a
lower court thinks better of its “measure with shoes” gloss on the “five feet tall” requirement, and decides instead to
evaluate the propriety of measuring on a purely case-by-case basis, it would be free to overrule its prior precedent
and reduce the overall specificity of its doctrinal commands. What the lower court cannot do, however, is to
displace a higher court rule with a standard of its own—it could not, for instance, install a “reasonably tall”
requirement in the stead of the “five feet tall” requirement that vertical stare decisis commands it to accept.
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and that information should eventually come to light regardless of whether courts articulate their
holdings in terms of generalizations, presumptions, and other rule-like norms. Insofar as the
rulification process works this way, the only available mechanism to prevent rulification of a
standard would be to prohibit courts from creating any precedents at all. Absent this extreme
solution,26 however, some amount of rulification will always occur. The specificity of the norm
will inevitably rise as the number of on-point judicial precedents increases. And given that fact,
it seems that in the long run, no rule against rulification will ever manage to achieve its
underlying objective.
One may accept the premise of this objection without accepting the conclusion. The key
is to recognize that, even though the rulification of standards might inevitably occur as a result of
common law adjudication, the pace at which it occurs can in fact be controlled. Suppose that
Suzie Q, a 13-year-old veteran of the fairground, wishes to experience the ride subject to our
open-ended “mature enough” requirement. The case comes before a judge, who decides that
Suzie Q is in fact mature enough to ride the ride. What does the decision of In re Suzie Q tell us
about the “mature-enough” standard? At a minimum, it tells us that children identical to Suzie Q
will satisfy the “mature enough” standard going forward. But precisely how, and to what extent,
must those children resemble Suzie Q? The answer to that question depends on the reasoning of
the Suzie Q decision itself. If the judge issues an opinion declaring that Suzie Q was mature
enough to ride the ride because and only because she was a teenager, that opinion will fill a huge
swath of previously unoccupied doctrinal space: Going forward, we would know that the
“mature enough” requirement incorporates a strong presumption of ride-worthiness applicable to
all children older than twelve. If, by contrast, the judge issues an opinion declaring that Suzie
Q’s maturity is evident from a holistic combination of her individual attributes—her age, her
size, her demeanor, her past experience at theme parks, etc.—then the opinion will provide far
less specification as to how future cases should be resolved. We would know that children
similar to Suzie Q have a good chance at satisfying the “mature enough” standard, but we could
still only hazard guesses as to how similar to Suzie Q the kids must be. These two contrasting
decisions in the Suzie Q case—although they yield the same disposition—carry substantially
different consequences for the rulification process; one moves the process along quite a bit, the
other merely inches it forward.
In this respect, judges can indeed control the extent to which they rulify a standard in any
given case, even if they cannot control the inevitable fact that, as they decide more cases, the
substance of the standard will become increasingly rule-like. And that in turn means that rules
against rulification, while perhaps not capable of stopping the process outright, can at least
decelerate it. Bound by a rule against rulification, our lower court judge would be less inhibited
from resolving In re Suzie Q according to categorical reasoning (i.e., Suzie Q gets to go on the
ride because and only because she is a teenager) and more inclined to employ a mushier and
more holistic analysis (i.e., Suzie Q gets to go on the ride because, all things considered, she
seems like a pretty mature kid). The rule against rulification would therefore tend to reduce the
extent of future substantive guidance provided by the decision, thus producing a much slower
rate of rulification over time. Lower court precedents would still accumulate, and along with
them, information regarding the standard’s applicability to a variety of cases. But each
decision’s contribution to the rulification process would be less substantial, meaning that
complete specification of the standard would occur over a significantly longer time horizon. For
26

For an extended discussion of this possibility, see Section VI.C infra.
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this reason, anti-rulification rules have profound practical effects. At the very least, they ensure
that standards remain static over the short-run, even if they are inevitably fated to evolve into
rules in the long-run.
D.
Subtleties, Nuances, Etc.
Lurking beneath the seemingly simple terms of “rules,” “standards,” “rulification,” and
“anti-rulification rules” are layers upon layers of complexity. The discussion thus far has steered
clear of complicating details, relying on artificial examples to help elucidate the core features of
the concepts being introduced. But before moving from tidy theory to messy reality, we should
expose some of these simplifying assumptions, so as to reveal some difficulties that arise when
attempting to classify and evaluate anti-rulification rules in the real world.
First, as we have already seen, the distinction between rules and standards is anything but
clean. The concepts merely approximate a property that is very much a matter of degree. What
is more, even when we replace the binary rules/standard frame with scalar comparisons of
specificity, determining the extent to which one norm is more or less specific is not always a
straightforward exercise either.27 But even though boundary cases will prove difficult, their
existence does not a useless concept make, and there remain many scenarios in which the labels
of “rule,” “standard,” “more specific,” and “less specific” can advance the analysis in a useful
and understandable way.
Second, and related to the first point, I have sometimes spoken as if the “rulification”
process involves the straightforward conversion of standards into rules. But this too is an
oversimplification; “rulification,” as I understand it, occurs any time a judicial decision
materially increases the specificity of a controlling legal norm. This can happen when
paradigmatic standards become paradigmatic rules. But it can also happen, for instance, when
courts make specific rules even more specific, (E.g., “In applying the requirement that would-be
riders’ must be at least five-feet tall, we will henceforth always measure the rider’s height
without reference to the shoes she is wearing.”), or when making highly amorphous standards
somewhat less so. (E.g., “In applying the requirement that riders must be ‘mature enough’ to
board the ride, we will henceforth measure maturity by reference to physical, rather than
emotional, characteristics.”). For simplicity’s sake, it may be helpful to view standards as the
input of a rulification process and rules as the output, but nothing of significance turns on this
particular point. What matters most for our purposes is (a) that courts put “meat on the bone” of
a legal directive when they apply that directive to future fact patterns; and (b) the Supreme Court
sometimes seeks to discourage them from doing just that.
Third, as we will soon see, the Supreme Court does not always speak with clarity
regarding the existence of a rule against rulification. Sometimes, for instance, the Court may
offer a lengthy justification for its own decision to favor a standard over a rule without indicating
whether the same reasoning extends to lower court rulifications of the standard. Sometimes, the
Court may reject a particular rulification of a standard, without further indicating whether its
rejection of that rulification would extend to alternative rulifications as well. In these and other
27

Try ranking the following three norms in terms of their specificity: (a) a categorical command with an amorphous
exception built into it (“No one less than five-feet-tall may board the ride, except where justice demands”); (b) a
non-categorical presumption with no exceptions attached (“We should in all cases disfavor letting people on rides
who are less than five feet tall.”); or (c) an open-ended norm that categorically excludes consideration of certain
criteria (“Only riders who are sufficiently mature may board the ride, provided that maturity is adjudged solely by
reference to physical characteristics.”). Different readers, I suspect, will come up with different answers.
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cases, Supreme Court precedents leave anti-rulification rules debatably and not definitively
present in the doctrine. This is a problem that Part III considers in detail; for now, it suffices to
note that observers will not always agree whether the Court has injected anti-rulification rules
into its case law.
Finally, I have thus far spoken as if doctrine can be reliably trusted to constrain future
decisionmaking. But this too is an oversimplification. Courts cannot always be trusted to follow
the precedents to which they are bound. Sometimes they forget about a controlling case;
sometimes they misread an opinion; sometimes they willfully ignore the law; and so forth.
Doctrine does not constrain as much as it purports to constrain; whatever influences it brings to
bear must compete with a host of countervailing forces: human error, political pressure, policy
preferences, and so forth. Even if controlling Supreme Court precedent dictates that a lower
court must apply a standard on a case-by-case basis, that command itself provides no guarantee
that lower courts will always do so.
This same point, however, applies to all doctrinal scholarship: If outside forces motivate
and explain judicial decisionmaking, the academic study of doctrine amounts to a colossal waste
of time. And, indeed, to the extent one truly and honestly believes that doctrine has no role to
play in affecting the decisions judges render, the claim is unassailable. But I don’t buy the
premise: I think doctrine has some role to play in motivating judicial outcomes, and so I regard it
as well worth studying as a force—though not the only force—underlying the resolution of
cases.28 Thus, even though we cannot always trust in anti-rulification rules’ ability to bind where
they purport to bind, we should not leap to the other extreme of insisting that they will never
carry real-world effect.
II.
THE REALITY OF ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES
Having established the conceptual possibility of rules against rulification, I now turn to
the question of their real-world existence. The aim of this Part is twofold. The first is to
demonstrate that the Supreme Court does in fact issue rules against rulification. The second is to
show that the Court’s anti-rulification commands do not amount to meaningless blather. That is,
lower courts pay attention to anti-rulification rules when applying the substantive standards to
which these rules attach. That is not to say that lower courts always abide by rules against
rulification; like any of the Supreme Court’s doctrinal commands, anti-rulification rules will
sometimes find themselves subject to creative manipulation or benign neglect in the courts
below. But they are not paper tigers either, as lower courts have often pointed to these rules as a
reason not to accept a rulification that litigants and/or trial court have invited them to adopt.
A.
The Supreme Court’s Commands
Florida v. Harris provides a nice introductory example of an anti-rulification rule: There,
the Court insisted that judges applying the probable cause test should reject “rigid rules, brightline tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things considered
approach.”29 Similar pronouncements have arisen in other areas of Fourth Amendment law. For
28

That is especially so, moreover, in the sorts of cases on which this article focuses: mine-run lower-court cases that
often lack politically salient dimensions. Cf. Michael Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial
Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 138-39 n.95 (2013) (suggesting that “legal doctrine matters little in landmark
constitutional decisions,” and that “the more passionately judges care about the underlying policy issue, the less
constraint they are likely to feel from the traditional legal sources” (emphasis added)).
29
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013). Harris’s anti-rulification commands accord with other Supreme
Court descriptions of the probable cause standard. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 235 (1983)
(rejecting previous formulations of the probable-cause standard as a “complex superstructure of evidentiary and
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instance, in evaluating the voluntariness of a defendant’s consent to a search, the Court has
“eschewed bright-line rules” and “disavowed litmus-paper test[s],” favoring instead a
“traditional contextual approach” that accommodates the “endless variations in the facts and
circumstances” that individual cases present.30 It has done the same in defining circumstances
under which citizens’ encounters with the police count as a Fourth Amendment “seizure.”31
And, in asking whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search, the Court has recently
called for a “finely tuned approach” that evaluates “each case of alleged exigency based on its
own facts and circumstances.”32
Other areas of criminal procedure law reveal anti-rulification rules at work. For example,
the Court’s suggestive identification jurisprudence—which asks whether police identification
procedures violate a defendant’s right to due process—“requires courts to assess, on a case-bycase basis, whether improper police conduct created a substantial likelihood of
misidentification.”33 Similarly, when asking whether “extraordinary circumstances” justify the
equitable tolling of postconviction filing deadlines, courts must apply the test “on a case-by-case
basis,” so as to avoid creating “hardships which, from time to time, arise from a hard and fast
adherence to more absolute legal rules.”34 In describing the “objective standard of
reasonableness” that defines the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the
Court has emphasized that “[s]pecific guidelines are not appropriate” and that “[n]o particular set
of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions” that counsel might
make.”35 And in articulating the boundaries of so-called “plain error” doctrine (governing
analytical rules,” and instead urging lower courts to treat probable cause as a “fluid concept—turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules”); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise
definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the
circumstances”).
30
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983)); Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988) (“Rather than adopting either rule proposed by the parties and determining
that an investigatory pursuit is or is not necessarily a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, we adhere to our
traditional contextual approach, and determine only that, in this particular case, the police conduct in question did
not amount to a seizure.”).
31
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991) (noting that the lower court “erred in adopting a per se rule” to
determine whether a police encounter constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure, as the lower court should have
“consider[ed] all the circumstances surrounding the encounter” in applying the applicable test).
32
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 n.3 (2013) (internal quotations omitted).
33
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2012) (internal citations omitted); see also Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (holding that “each case must be considered on its own facts”).
34
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649-50 (2010) (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S.
238, 248 (1944)); see also id. at 669 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attributing to the majority the view that “all general
rules are ipso facto incompatible with equity).
35
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1406 (2011) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89
(1984)); see also id. at 1407 n.17 (“[T]he Strickland test of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the
evidence.” (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000))). A related example comes from Roe v. FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), which concerned an attorney’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Two lower
courts had held that an attorney’s failure to file such a notice qualified as per se deficient under Strickland ,absent an
explicit request from the defendant not to do so. Id. at 478. The Court rejected this formulation of test, concluding
that it “failed to engage in the circumstance-specific reasonableness inquiry” that Strickland required. Id.; see also
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1119-20 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (holding that “the distinction
between misrepresentations and omissions, on which the majority relies in classifying lower court precedent, implies
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forfeiture of claims not raised at trial), the Court has warned of the dangers associated with “a
per se approach to plain error review”—an approach that is flatly inconsistent with the “casespecific and fact-intensive basis” on which plain error analysis is supposed to proceed.36
The Court has also invoked anti-rulification rules in the civil context. When it first set
forth the three-part balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge,37 for instance, the Court made clear
that the open-ended nature of the test reflected “the truism that due process, unlike some legal
rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances.”38 Following up on this point some 20 years later, the Court would invalidate a
lower court attempt to embed an “absolute rule” within the Mathews framework, reasoning that
the precedential support for such an approach was “far outweighed by the clarity of our
precedents which emphasize the flexibility of due process as contrasted with the sweeping and
categorical rule” the lower court had adopted.39 Or, as the Court has more recently put the point,
“[b]ecause the requirements of due process are flexible and call for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands, we generally have declined to establish rigid rules and
instead have embraced a framework to evaluate the sufficiency of particular procedures.”40
Consider also the Court’s recent description of the standard for issuing permanent
injunctions in civil cases. In eBay v. MercExchange, the Court defined the relevant “principles
of equity” in terms of a “traditional four-factor test,” and then went on to fault both lower court
decisions in the case for applying this test in an unduly rulified way. The district court, that is,
had erred by “appear[ing] to adopt certain expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief
could not issue in a broad swath of cases.”41 The court of appeals had erred, meanwhile, by
adopting a “general rule” that was too accepting of injunctive relief. Though each court had
reached a different result, both had committed the same methodological mistake: “[J]ust as the
District Court erred in its categorical denial of injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals erred in its
categorical grant of such relief.”42 Both lower courts, in other words, had ignored the fact that
the relevant doctrinal analysis depended on “traditional equitable principles,” which “do not
permit such broad classifications.”43 Going forward, as Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion
a categorical rule that is inconsistent with Strickland’s requirement of a case-by-case assessment of an attorney’s
performance.”).
36
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 142, 145-46 (2009). More particularly, the anti-rulification rule here
concerns the fourth prong of the plain-error test, which asks whether failure to address a forfeited error on appeal
would result in a “miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (internal quotations and
alterations omitted). It is this component of the plain error inquiry, the Court has made clear, that “is meant to be
applied on a case-specific and fact-intensive basis.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142..
37
Under the Mathews test, Courts must weigh “[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest.” 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).
38
Id. at 334 (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961)); see also Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985) (“The flexibility of our
approach in due process cases is intended in part to allow room for other forms of dispute resolution; with respect to
the individual interests at stake here, legislatures are to be allowed considerable leeway to formulate such processes
without being forced to conform to a rigid constitutional code of procedural necessities.”).
39
Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 931 (1997).
40
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
41
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).
42
Id. at 394.
43
Id. at 393.
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put the point, courts were to apply the “well-established[] four-factor test—without resort to
categorical rules.”44
Or, take the law of intellectual property. In articulating the standard for determining
whether a claimed invention is too “obvious” to qualify as patentable, the Court once faulted the
Federal Circuit for “analyz[ing] the issue in a narrow, rigid manner inconsistent with [the Patent
Act] and our precedents.”45 These precedents, the Court emphasized, “set forth an expansive and
flexible approach” to obviousness determinations, which should not be “transform[ed] . . . into a
rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry.”46 And the Court has sung a similar tune in
defining the “fair use” defense to copyright infringement: Simply put, the analysis of fair-use
claims is “not to be simplified with bright-line rules.”47 Congress, in short, had “eschewed a
rigid, bright-line approach to fair use” when it codified the defense,48 meaning that any fair use
claim “has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be judged case by case, in light of
the ends of the copyright law.”49
Finally, consider the Court’s Takings Clause doctrine. While the Court has characterized
some types of government conduct as “per se takings,”50 it has emphasized that most areas of
takings analysis must proceed in a manner that accounts for the “particular circumstances of each
case.”51 In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, for instance, a lower court
attempted to hold that recurrent, though temporary, floodings of land could never constitute a
taking of property.52 But the Court rejected this “categorical bar” as inconsistent with the
principle that “no magic formula enables a court to judge, in every case, whether a given
government interference with property is a taking.”53 Much to the contrary, the Court held,
“[f]looding cases, like other takings cases, should be assessed with reference to the particular
circumstances of each case and not by resorting to blanket exclusionary rules.”54 The proper
approach, in other words, called for “situation-specific factual inquiries.”55
44

Id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1044
(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that in eBay, the Court “disapproved of the use of ‘categorical’ rules regarding irreparable
harm in patent infringement cases”); Copyright Injunctions and Fair Use: Enter eBay – Four Factor Fatigue or
Four-Factor Freedom?, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 449, 457 (2008) (attributing to eBay the proposition that “[t]here
can be no categorical rules, no categorical denial of injunctive relief or categorical grant of such relief”).
45
KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427-28 (2007).
46
Id. at 419.
47
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
48
Id. at 584.
49
Id. at 581.
50
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (physical takings); Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (regulatory measures that eliminate all economically
beneficial uses of land).
51
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Company, 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); see also see also United States v.
Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952) (“No rigid rules can be laid down to distinguish compensable losses from
noncompensable losses.”). Also within the takings context, the Court has arguably adopted an anti-rulification rule
in connection with the Takings Clause’s public use requirement. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,
483 (2005) (“[O]ur public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas . . . .”); United States v. Toronto,
Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402, (1949) (“Perhaps no warning has been more repeated than
that the determination of value [for just-compensation purposes] cannot be reduced to inexorable rules.”).
52
Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
53
Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012).
54
Id. at 521 (internal quotations omitted).
55
Id. at 518.
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In sum, several different areas of Supreme Court doctrine, spanning both constitutional
and nonconstitutional cases, reveal attempts by the Court to dictate not just the substance of a
doctrinal standard, but also the method by which lower courts should apply the standard in future
cases. With that in mind, let’s now investigate whether the lower courts pay any attention to
these commands.
B.
The Lower Courts’ Responses
This Section highlights lower court cases that cite anti-rulification rules as reasons not to
rulify a standard. That is, in entertaining a potential rule-like application of a standard, the courts
in these cases point back to the Supreme Court’s methodological commands as precluding such
an approach. These examples cannot definitely prove that anti-rulification rules carry real-world
force; sometimes, for instance, lower courts might invoke the Court’s anti-rulification rules as
post-hoc rationalizations for holdings that they are already inclined to issue.56 Nevertheless, the
examples below at least help to indicate that anti-rulification rules place some weight on the
methodological scale, rendering judges less inclined than otherwise to flesh out Supreme Court
holdings in rule-like terms.
Consider first the lower courts’ application of the Fourth Amendment probable cause
standard. In United States v. Brundidge,57 for instance, the Eleventh Circuit declined to
invalidate a search based on an affidavit that lacked independent police corroboration. The
problem, in short, was that such a holding would effectively “requir[e] independent police
corroboration as a per se rule in each and every case.”58 Such a rule was inappropriate, the court
reasoned, not only because it lacked direct support in prior cases,59 but also, and more
fundamentally, because the Supreme Court has “criticiz[ed] per se rules for the determination of
probable cause.”60 Other lower courts have employed analogous reasoning to reject related
rulifications of both the probable cause standard and other Supreme Court standards within
Fourth Amendment law.61
56

And sometimes, indeed, lower court dissenters have accused their colleagues of outright ignoring the Court’s antirulification rules. See, e.g., United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1106 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Gould, J.,
dissenting) (accusing the majority of “adopting a bright-line, ‘one size fits all’” plain error rule, in contravention of
the Supreme Court’s anti-rulification commands).
57
170 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1999).
58
Id. at 1353.
59
Id. (noting that “independent police corroboration has never been treated as a requirement in each and every
case”).
60
Id.
61
Such claims involve, for instance, the voluntariness of a defendant’s consent to search, see, e.g., United States v.
Gonzalez-Garcia, 708 F.3d 682, 688 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Gonzalez appears to argue that consent is coerced whenever
police use an unwarned statement to obtain consent. But a categorical rule is inconsistent with the multi-factor,
holistic approach to assessing voluntariness that this Court and the Supreme Court have endorsed”); United States v.
Montgomery, 621 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir. 2010) (rejecting “a per se rule that medication (or intoxication) necessarily
defeats an individual's capacity to consent,” on the ground that “per se rules are anathema to the Fourth
Amendment”); United States v. Guimond, 116 F.3d 166, 170-171 (6th Cir. 1997) (highlighting “the Supreme Court's
fourth attempt to point out that per se or bright-line rules are inconsistent with that court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence” before rejecting a proposed bright-line rule that would have automatically linked the presence of an
illegal detention to a finding of involuntary consent), the presence of Fourth Amendment seizures, see, e.g., United
States v. Broomfied, 201 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2000) (refusing to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s “per se rule
that authorities must notify bus passengers of the right to refuse consent before questioning those passengers and
asking for consent to search luggage,” and holding instead that “such notification is a relevant fact to consider, [but]
cannot be dispositive of the reasonableness inquiry”); United States v. Stephens, 232 F.3d 746, 747-48 (9th Cir.
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Similar results appear in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine, where the Court has
warned against the use of “specific guidelines” to assess the reasonableness of an attorney’s
conduct.62 In Harrington v. Gillis, for example, the Third Circuit reviewed a habeas petitioner’s
ineffective-assistance claim, based on his defense attorney’s failure to appeal from a criminal
conviction in Pennsylvania court.63 The state court had rejected this claim, invoking the rule that
“before a court will find ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to file a direct appeal,
Appellant must prove that he requested an appeal and that counsel disregarded this request.”64
But the Third Circuit rejected the state court’s reasoning, holding that it contravened clearly
established federal law. The problem, again, was one of method: The Supreme Court had
“definitively rejected any per se rules for adjudicating claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel,”65 and the state court had attempted to apply a per se rule. Put another way, the state
court had treated one and only feature of the counsel’s conduct “as dispositive,” when it should
have “consider[ed] all the circumstances” presented by the claim, thus “engag[ing] in the
circumstance-specific reasonableness inquiry required by Strickland.”66
Procedural due process doctrine also reveals lower courts taking seriously the Supreme
Court’s anti-rulification commands. In McClure v. Biesenbach, for instance, the Fifth Circuit
made short shrift of a claim that due process required predeprivation proceedings before a
municipality abated a noise nuisance; such a “per se” claim wouldn’t work, the court explained,
because “the mandates of due process are inherently flexible, and the courts must balance public

2000) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting to denial of rehearing en banc) (admonishing the majority for adopting a per se
rule contrary to controlling Supreme Court precedent), and the presence of exigent circumstances justifying a
warrantless search, see, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 488 Fed. Appx. 99, 103 (6th Cir. 2012) (“we have . . .
established that the appropriate inquiry when evaluating exigent circumstances is to consider the totality of the
circumstances”). Relatedly, lower courts have also invoked the Court’s anti-rulification rules when evaluating due
process claims arising from suggestive identification procedures. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cook, 706 F.3d 25, 33–34
(1st Cir. 2013) (endorsing a “totality of the circumstances” approach to determine the likelihood of misidentification
(citing Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 724-25 (2012)),
62
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1407.
63
456 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2006).
64
Commonwealth v. Harmon, 738 A.2d 1023, 1024 (Pa. Super. 1999).
65
Harrington, 456 F.3d at 126. But see United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1148 (10th Cir. 2010) (endorsing
“a narrow per se rule of ineffectiveness where a defendant is, unbeknownst to him, represented by someone who has
not been admitted to any bar based on his “failure to ever meet the substantive requirements for the practice of law.”
(quoting Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 1983)).
66
Harrington, 456 F.3d at 126 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687-88; Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at
478-79). For additional examples of lower court adherence to anti-rulification rules in ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel cases, see Miles v. Ryan, 713 F.3d 477, 491-92 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding, in light of Pinholster’s antirulification rule, that the defendant’s attorney did not act unreasonably simply by deciding not to investigate the
defendant’s social history); State v. Starks, 833 N.W.2d 146, 164 (Wis. 2013) (acknowledging “that Strickland [does
not] impose[] a constitutional duty upon counsel to investigate.”)); Commonwealth v. Philistin, 53 A.3d 1, 26 (Pa.
2012) (noting that “specific guidelines are not appropriate” for determining whether an “attorney’s representation
amount to incompetence”). Lower courts have expressed similar reluctance to rulify the Supreme Court’s standards
governing requests for equitable tolling of filing deadlines. See, e.g., Palacios v. Stephens, 723 F.3d 600, 606 (5th
Cir. 2013) (rejecting a proposed rulification of the equitable tolling standard on the ground that it would “be in
tension with . . . the Supreme Court’s recent guidance that equitable tolling decisions ‘must be made on a case-bycase basis’”); Pabon v. Mahoney, 654 F.3d 385, 399 (3d Cir. 2011) (“There are no bright lines in determining
whether equitable tolling is warranted in a given case. Rather, the particular circumstances of each petitioner must
be taken into account.”).
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and private interests.”67 More generally, courts have repeatedly incanted Mathews’s antirulification rhetoric, emphasizing, for instance, that “administrative proceedings . . . must be
carefully assessed to determine what process is due given the specific circumstances involved,”68
and that “[t]he precise procedural protections of due process vary, depending upon the
circumstances, because due process is a flexible concept unrestricted by any bright-line rules.”69
Consider too the way in which the Court’s eBay decision has affected subsequent lowercourt analyses of equitable remedies. In Sanders v. Mountain America Federal Credit Union,70
for example, the Tenth Circuit invalidated a “pleading rule” that a district court had applied to
requests for injunctive relief under the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). The rule, as the
Tenth Circuit described it, “require[d] all consumers who seek to compel TILA rescission [of an
unlawful loan] to plead their ability to repay the loan” as a precondition to the district court’s
granting of such relief.71 But by issuing such a rule the district court had ignored the fact that
“[t]he Supreme Court has rejected the application of categorical rules in injunction cases.”72
eBay’s anti-rulification rule, in other words, had made clear that “categorical relief is beyond the
reach of the courts’ equitable powers.”73 Rather than issue a rule applicable to all consumers in
all TILA cases, the district court should have “weigh[ed] the case-specific equities in favor of
both parties and the public interest.”74
Case law involving both the Patent Act’s “obviousness” standard and the Copyright Act’s
fair-use defense also reveal lower court adherence to the Supreme Court’s anti-rulification rules.
The Federal Circuit recently rejected an inventor’s claim of nonobviousness as premised on a
“restrictive view” that would “present a rigid test” for obviousness, in violation of the Supreme
Court’s command that “[t]he obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic
conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation.”75 Similarly, the Second Circuit
has refused to adopt a rule under which a defendant’s bad-faith appropriation of copyright
67

McClure v. Bisenbach, 355 Fed. Appx. 800, 806 n.2 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Lezcano-Bonilla v. MatosRodriguez, No. 07-1453, 2010 WL 3372514, at *7 (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010) (“Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932
(1997), ‘rejected a categorical rule imposing constitutional due process requirements on suspensions without pay.’
Accordingly, this Circuit has rejected the notion that due process always requires a predeprivation hearing.”)
(quoting Torres–Rosado v. Rotger–Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003)).
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Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2013);
69
Steinert v. Winn Grp. Inc., 440 F.3d 1214, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006).
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689 F.3d 1138 (10th Cir. 2012).
71
Id. at 1143.
72
Id. at 1144 (quoting RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegel, 552 F.3d 1203, 1210 (10th Cir. 2009)).
73
Id. at 1143-44
74
Id iat 1144. A related set of cases involves the so-called “presumption of irreparable harm” in patent and
copyright cases, which, prior to eBay, many lower courts had routinely applied in connection with requests for
injunctive relief. Although “[t]he Supreme Court [in eBay] did not expressly address the presumption of irreparable
harm,” Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2011), at least three courts of
appeals have since jettisoned the presumption as inconsistent with eBay’s rule against rulification. Id.; Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Google Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2011) (characterizing the presumption as “clearly irreconcilable with
the reasoning of the Court’s decision in eBay); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 76-78 (2d Cir. 2010). eBay, the
Federal Circuit has explained, made clear that ‘broad classifications’ and ‘categorical rule[s]’ have no place in this
inquiry,” meaning that plaintiffs “can no longer rely on presumptions or other short-cuts to support a request for a
permanent injunction.” Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1148-49. Put another way, eBay “warned against reliance on
presumptions or categorical rules,” meaning that “the propriety of injunctive relief” in patent and copyright cases
“must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in accord with traditional equitable principles and without the aid of
presumptions or a ‘thumb on the scale’ in favor of issuing such relief.” Perfect 10, 653 F.3d at 979-81.
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Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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material would be “dispositive of a fair use defense,”76 citing the Supreme Court’s “warning
against the application of ‘bright-line’ rules in fair use analysis.”77
Finally, in Quebedeaux v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims confronted a takings
claim arising from government-induced flooding of private land.78 In Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission, recall, the Court had refused to hold that temporary floodings of land fell
categorically beyond the scope of the Takings Clause, holding instead that the takings analysis
required “reference to the particular circumstances of each case.”79 Quebedeaux, by contrast,
raised the question of how often such floodings needed to occur in order to implicate justcompensation requirements. The Government had asked the lower court to adopt a “bright-line
rule” according to which “a single flooding event may not give rise to a takings,” but the court
rejected this approach as inconsistent with the “multi-factored, factually-intensive nature of the
takings analysis.”80 Instead, the court held, the inquiry “require[d] an examination of multiple
factors, certainly beyond whether actual flooding has occurred once, twice, or even a dozen
times.”81
These examples highlight the breadth of anti-rulification rules. In none of these cases did
lower courts reject rulifications identical to ones that the Supreme Court had previously rejected;
much to the contrary, they rejected rulifications that the Court had never before considered. And
they did so because they read the applicable Supreme Court precedents to establish not just a
substantive prohibition on one particular rulification, but also a methodological prohibition on
any and all attempts to make a standard a rule.
C.
The Alternative Approach
By now, the reader may be thinking: “Wait a minute! These examples stand for only the
utterly unremarkable proposition that the Supreme Court sometimes adopts standards. That’s
hardly worth writing home about, much less in law-review-article form.” But the rejoinder to
that argument has already been advanced: as Part I made clear, a standard accompanied by an
anti-rulification rule (what I have called a “mandatory standard”) is not the same thing as a
76

NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Institute, 364 F.3d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id.; see also Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 n.6 (9th Cir. 1997)
(“The district court concluded that Penguin and Dove may not employ the four-factor fair use analysis if the
infringing work is not a parody. The application of this presumption is in error. The Supreme Court has thus far
eschewed bright line rules, favoring a case-by-case balancing.”); Sega Enterprises Ltd. V. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing to recognize a “per se right to disassemble object code” in light of the “case-bycase” and “equitable” nature of fair use analysis); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1279 (11th
Cir. 2001) (Marcus, J. concurring) (“Fair use adjudication requires case-by-case analysis and eschews bright-line
rules.”) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251
(2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he determination of fair use is an open-ended and context-sensitive inquiry. In Campbell, the
Supreme Court warned that the task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it
recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”). For examples from the patent law context, see, e.g., Innogenetics,
N.V. v. Abbott Laboratories, 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 n.3 (Fed Cir. 2008) (“We are mindful that in KSR, the Supreme
Court made clear that a finding of teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine is not a ‘rigid rule that limits the
obviousness inquiry.’”) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007)); Rentrop v. Spectranetics
Corp., 550 F.3d 1112, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that the lower court’s jury instructions did not violate the
Supreme Court’s methodological instructions regarding the TSM principle because the court described the principle
in “unrigid terms”).
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112 Fed. Cl. 317 (2013).
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Quebedeaux, 112 Fed. Cl. at 324.
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Id. at 324.
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standard standing alone (what I have called a “permissive standard”). I have already offered
conceptual support for that point, but let me briefly hammer it home with a few concrete
examples of permissive standards at work.
One permissive standard resides within Miranda doctrine. Though the Miranda warning
itself reflects a bright-line rule, courts must still determine when such warnings are necessary.
And here the Supreme Court’s guidance has taken on a more standard-like character.
Specifically, the Court has explained that Miranda applies once an interaction between law
enforcement and an individual takes the form of a “custodial interrogation.”82 What counts as a
custodial interrogation? While the Court has offered some guidance on this point, it has largely
delegated the development of governing law to the lower courts.83 This move, in turn, has led
some courts to rulify important aspects of their doctrines concerning the scope of custodial
interrogations. The Third Circuit, for instance, has stipulated that the routine questioning of
immigrants at border checkpoints qualifies as per se noncustodial for Miranda purposes.84
Relatedly, several circuits have ruled that valid Terry stops never give rise to custodial
circumstances.85 Until recently, the Sixth Circuit had applied a “bright-line test” to cases
involving in-prison interrogations, according to which Miranda warnings “must be given when
an inmate is isolated from the general prison population and interrogated about conduct outside
of the prison.”86 And the Court itself has deemed questioning pursuant to a “routine traffic stop”
to be noncustodial.87 These rulifications of Miranda’s definition of “custody” remain good law
today, notwithstanding the fact that Miranda originally defined “custody” by reference to a
standard rather than a rule.
A second example involves the identification of circumstances triggering application of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In Massiah v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
82

Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 425 (1984).
On one point, the Court has been clear: the determination must be based on the “objective circumstances of the
interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being
questioned.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994).
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United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 2006) ([T]here is not likely to be the “restraint on freedom of
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border of the United States.”). For a different, more standard-oriented approach, see United States v. FNU LNU, 653
F.3d 144 (2011) (noting that “the inquiry remains a holistic one in which the nature and context of the questions
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85
See, e.g., United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, Terry stops do not
implicate the requirements of Miranda. . . .”).
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the post-indictment right-to-counsel covered not only overt interrogations by known government
officers, but also covert investigations conducted by “government agents.”88 Yet the Court has
offered little guidance as to who counts as a “government agent”89—what to do, for instance,
about government informants?—and the lower courts have hazarded different means of
answering the question for themselves. Some circuits have applied a “bright-line rule,” under
which an individual becomes a “government agent” only when “instructed by the police to get
information about the particular defendant.”90 Other circuits, by contrast, utilize a standardbased approach, identifying Massiah-worthy government agents by reference to the “facts and
circumstances” of each case.91 Thus, by allowing lower courts to choose between rules and
standards to facilitate their application of the “government agent” test, Massiah appears to have
left a permissive standard in its wake—one as to which further rulification is neither required nor
prohibited.
One further example comes from administrative law. In United States v. Mead Corp., the
Supreme Court expounded on its holding in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council, which set forth the basic framework for reviewing agencies’ interpretations of their
enabling statutes.92 Specifically, Mead held that Chevron deference applies only when an
agency has offered its interpretation when exercising validly delegated powers to act with “the
force of law”; when, in contrast, the agency does not so act, courts must apply the somewhat less
deferential (and more open-ended) framework of Skidmore v. Swift Co. This distinction—
between actions that do and do not “carry the force of law”—drew immediate criticism from
Justice Scalia, who, dissenting in Mead, attacked the standard as hopelessly vague.93 In a
subsequent analysis of the decision, however, Professor Thomas Merrill argued persuasively that
the lack of any clarity in Mead’s “force-of-law” was hardly a harbinger of doctrinal doom. In his
view, “nothing the Court did or said [in Mead] precludes future decisions that brush away the
fuzziness in the majority’s exposition, leaving us with a clear and defensible meta-rule” for
determining when Chevron applies.94 Put another way, as substantively vague as the “force-oflaw” requirement might seem to have been, the Court did not attach to it any anti-rulification
88
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rules. And so Justice Scalia’s concerns about doctrinal vagueness may well prove misbegotten
as courts—including the Supreme Court—create sharp-edged rulifications of Mead over time.
The like locus of subsequent rulification, in Professor Merrill’s view, was the Supreme
Court itself, rather than in the circuit courts tasked with applying the “meta-standard” of Mead.95
But there is no reason why lower courts cannot start “brush[ing] away the fuzziness” for
themselves while awaiting further guidance from the Court. They might, for instance, hold that
some forms of agency guidance (such as interpretive rules passed pursuant to notice-andcomment procedures) are presumptively entitled to Chevron deference,96 whereas other forms
(such as agency positions set forth in amicus briefs) are presumptively entitled to no such
deference.97 Building on a suggestion offered by Mead itself,98 lower courts might hold that
properly enacted legislative rules, having undergone notice-and-comment procedures,
automatically trigger Chevron deference—thus establishing a safe harbor for agencies wanting to
ensure deferential review of the interpretations they have propounded.99 None of this is to say
that lower courts have no right to express confusion and frustration as to precisely what Mead
and its progeny have instructed them to do.100 Nevertheless, they remain free to mitigate the
confusion by rulfiying the “force of law” criterion on their own.101 That option would not have
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been available to them if Mead had stipulated that downstream appliers of the “force of law” test
must issue holdings on a “case-by-case” basis, only by reference to the “totality of the
circumstances.”102 But Mead said nothing of the sort; it simply adopted an open-ended standard
without placing limits on lower-courts’ ability to specify the content of that standard over time.
III.
THE LIMITED VALUE OF ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES
Thus far, this Article has established that standards laid down by the Supreme Court may
operate in either of two ways. If such standards are accompanied by rules against rulification,
then lower courts may not develop specific rules concerning the standard’s application. But if
they are not accompanied by rules against rulification, then lower courts may freely choose to
rulify or not to rulify as they best see fit. With this descriptive picture drawn, the Article now
turns to a normative appraisal. What is the value of anti-rulification rules? What respective
costs and benefits do they generate? When should courts use them, and when should they not?103
At an intuitive level, the value of anti-rulification rules seems clear: Once the Court has
opted for a standard over a rule, an anti-rulification rule ensures allegiance to that choice. We
have already seen that the standard-like nature of a legal norm does not in and of itself prohibit
further specification (and, thus, rulification) by lower ranking actors. A standard-like norm is an
unelaborated norm; lower courts can and do flesh out the meaning of that norm in concrete and
particular terms. To the extent, then, that the Supreme Court sees virtue in a standard-dependent
method of applying law to fact, a rule against rulification imposes the additional constraint
needed to prohibit lower court departures from that choice.
To see the point more clearly, consider the tradeoff between the substantive value of fit,
on the one hand, and the procedural values of predictability, uniformity, and low decision costs,
on the other. The great virtue of standards—and the corresponding vice of rules—relates to the
minimization of over- and under-inclusiveness problems. Rules are the product of broad
brushes; standards the fine-tipped pen. Thus, standards are less likely than rules to yield
individual outcomes that seem obtuse, unfair, or otherwise contrary to the “spirit” of the
doctrinal inquiry. But that benefit comes at a price: all else equal, applying a rule to the facts of
a case decreases the workload of judges and litigants who engage in the task. It requires little
effort—and engenders minimal uncertainty—to determine whether an individual is or is not

“force of law” criterion applies, and that in turn should enhance the clarity of the doctrine that they themselves
employ.
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taller than five feet. By contrast, determining whether she is “mature enough” to board a ride
entails a more difficult, more variable, and less predictable task.
When a Court opts for a standard over a rule, it will have implicitly decided that, given
the nature of the particular doctrinal inquiry at issue, the fit-related benefits of the standard are
significant enough to outweigh the uniformity- and predictability-related benefits of a rule. Put
another way, the adoption of a standard signals an attitude from the Court that, whatever benefits
a rule-like formulation might have offered along the lines of certainty, simplicity, and reduced
decision costs, these pluses are outweighed by the fit-related benefits that a standard confers.104
But where the need to minimize over- and underinclusiveness is especially significant, the Court
might conclude that downstream rulification of the standard would eradicate the very same
benefits that initially warranted its adoption. When the Court adopts a rule against rulification, it
is effectively saying: “Look. We think that considerations of fit and fairness take on paramount
importance within this area of doctrine. Therefore, in addition to opting for a standard over a
rule, we are making clear that the methodological question is not open for relitigation in future
cases. You may be tempted to ease decisional burdens on yourself by rulifying the standard we
have enunciated—but, if you did that, you would create the very same problems that compelled
us to adopt the standard in the first place. Therefore, you must apply this standard on a case-bycase basis, without any reliance on ancillary rules.”
Under many circumstances, however, the proponent of a legal standard might reasonably
decide not to adopt an anti-rulification rule. And the remainder of this Part sets out to identify
those sorts of circumstances in detail. When, in other words, might the Court wish to implement
a standard on the one hand, while still leaving open pathways for its eventual conversion into a
patchwork of rules? Tempting as it may be to suppose that the desirability of an anti-rulification
rule always follows from the desirability of a standard itself—to suppose, in other words, that
any time the Court opts for a standard over a rule, it should naturally want to fortify the standard
against rulification in subsequent cases—the proposition turns out not to be true, or so I will
argue in this Part. There are in fact several reasons why a Court might wish to withhold antirulification rules from even its most standard-like pronouncements. The remainder of this Part
takes on the task of identifying when this might be so.
A.
Experimentation
A primary downside to anti-rulification rules relates to the lower courts’ role in
developing Supreme Court doctrine. These courts, unlike the Supreme Court, are categorically
bound by Supreme Court precedents; according to well established principles of vertical stare
decisis, they cannot simply set aside Supreme Court rulings that they regard as counterproductive
or unwise. Even faced with such strict precedential constraints, however, lower courts make
their own independent contributions to the Supreme Court’s work. Lower courts apply existing
Supreme Court law to new fact patterns, and in so doing provide a substantial information base
for the Court to draw on when considering further changes to the law. By resolving the lion’s
share of cases that arise under the Supreme Court’s precedents, lower courts attempt to make
sense of these precedents in innumerable ways. When the time later comes for the Court itself to
update these precedents, the lower courts’ body of work can valuably inform the Court’s
decision of which way to go.
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Given this fact, the Court should avoid anti-rulification rules when it faces uncertainty as
to whether a rule-like or standard-like pronouncement would better serve an area of doctrine.
When this is so, the Court might benefit from freeing up the lower courts to experiment with
both rules and standards in applying the permissive standard it has tentatively adopted. The
increased methodological freedom afforded the lower courts would then benefit the Court’s
ultimate resolution of the rules/standard question for itself. For example, the Court might
become more inclined to replace the (permissive) standard with a rule after observing that all of
the lower courts have immediately undertaken efforts to rulify the interim standard. Or it might
be inclined to make the standard mandatory after encountering dicta in a lower court opinion that
persuasively explains why rulification of the standard would be counterproductive. Or, if the
lower courts apply divergent approaches (with some preserving the standard in its original form
and with others converting the standard into a system of rules), the Court might base its ultimate
decision on a sort of comparative assessment of how the norm has fared in rulifying and nonrulifying jurisdictions.
What is more, due recognition for the benefits of lower-court experimentation might also
lead the Court to adopt a permissive standard even when it knows that rules should ultimately
control the relevant field of law. This is because lower-court experimentation might usefully
assist the Court in selecting the appropriate formulation of the rule (or rules) that will one day
prevail. The Court may be interested to know, in other words, how “rulifying” jurisdictions go
about specifying the content of the open-ended standard it has provisionally articulated, so that
on a future occasion, it may consider between and among the lower courts’ different rulification
strategies in ultimately settling on its own rule-like articulation of the norm. To take a simple
example, holding that a driver broke the law because he drove “unreasonably” settles far less law
than holding that the driver broke the law because (and only because) his speed exceeded 65
miles per hour. With the first holding on the books, lower courts would have to grapple with the
meaning of the Court’s “reasonableness” requirement. They will consider difficult cases at the
margins of reasonable driving, and in so doing, identify a more specific set of conditions under
which reasonableness can and cannot be shown. (For example, the lower courts might hold that
driving under the influence is always unreasonable, that driving while talking on the cellphone is
always unreasonable, except when the phone call involves an emergency, and so on.)
Eventually, these courts’ work could provide the basis for better-informed, down-the-road
specification by the Court itself.
There is a close parallel here to the well-accepted practice by which the Court lets
unsettled legal questions “percolate” in the lower courts below before granting certiorari to
resolve the questions for itself. In many instances, the Court lets lower courts process a difficult
legal problem before attempting to impose a single solution on the nation as a whole. Indeed, the
Justices themselves have openly stated that many denials of certiorari rest on this ground.105 But
percolation might still remain desirable even after the Court has granted certiorari in a given case
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and decided it on the merits. Some aspects of a legal problem may be ripe for definitive
resolution, even though others are not. And for those aspects of the problem warranting further
percolation, the Court can activate the percolation process through the provisional selection of a
standard over a rule.
When utilizing standards to transform lower courts into laboratories, the Court should not
pair those standards with rules against rulification. Lower courts cannot experiment with
different rule-like approaches to a problem if the Supreme Court has prohibited rulification
altogether. To return to the example of the unreasonable driver, if the presence of bad motoring
must always be adjudged by reference to the “totality of circumstances,” without the assistance
of rule-like specifications of the reasonableness requirement, then lower courts’ application of
the standard will yield less valuable information for the Court to draw upon in case it wants to
replace the standard with a set of hard-and-fast rules. The rule against rulification, in other
words, freezes future law development in the lower courts, thus depriving the Court of useful
data points regarding potential formulations of a rule, arguments for and against those
formulations, the behavioral effects of those formulations within the jurisdictions that employ
them, and so on. That is not to say that the absence of lower court data precludes the Court from
replacing a mandatory standard with a rule; doctrinally speaking, the Court may always choose
to ignore its own previous anti-rulification rule and specify the standard however it pleases. But
if the only lower court precedents on the books are ones that apply the standard in a holistic,
highly standard-based fashion, the Court’s own later reshaping of the standard must essentially
start from scratch.
B.
Downward Delegation
In evaluating the desirability of an anti-rulification rule, courts must also consider its
delegating effects. Standards, unlike rules, carry the consequence of devolving decisionmaking
downward. Rather than specify what an operative norm does and does not permit, the enactor of
a legal standard leaves such matters for lower-ranking actors to decide—via the repeated
resolution of cases arising under the standard’s open-ended terms. Thus, as other commentators
have noted, the decision to adopt a standard is, in effect, a decision to delegate downward,
vesting lower-ranking actors with the ultimate authority to dictate results in a wide range of
cases. Justice Scalia himself has noted this point, observing that “when we decide a case on the
basis of what we have come to call the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test, it is not we who will
be ‘closing in on the law’ in the foreseeable future, but rather thirteen different courts of
appeals—or, if it is a federal issue that can arise in state court litigation as well, thirteen different
courts of appeals and fifty state supreme courts.”106
Standards thus delegate authority downward. The more subtle point is that the
destination of the delegation depends on whether the Court supplements its newly declared
standard with an anti-rulification rule. Permissive standards achieve the result that Justice Scalia
predicts; they vest lawmaking authority in judicial actors at the intermediate court level.
Mandatory standards, by contrast, will push the delegation all the way down to the bottom of the
judicial hierarchy, largely bypassing the intermediate courts on the way down.
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Recall that only permissive standards empower intermediate-level courts (such as the
thirteen circuit courts or the fifty state supreme courts) to impose rules on the lower courts they
oversee; mandatory standards, by contrast, prohibit the intermediate courts from doing much
more than affirming or reversing each trial court decision on the basis of its own unique record.
Anti-rulification rules, in other words, substantially limit the amount of precedential guidance
that intermediate-level courts can provide to the courts within their purview, thus giving bottomlevel courts (i.e., federal district courts and state trial courts) freer rein to apply Supreme Court
standards according to their own best judgments. To be sure, intermediate courts can, do, and
should continue to reverse lower-level decisions that in their view misapply the governing
standards. But with the pronouncement of an anti-rulification rule comes the crucial added
condition that such reversals may not be accompanied by opinions going far beyond the facts of
the case. The precedential sweep of these intermediate court rulings will therefore be narrow.
And with intermediate courts constrained in their ability to direct the efforts of their subordinate
actors, the subordinate actors necessarily acquire increased control over the standard’s
implementation.
Related to the de facto delegation of authority to lower courts effected by mandatory
standard is another recurring feature of Supreme Court doctrine: the combination of antirulification rules with deferential standards of appellate review.107 The latter, like the former,
prevents intermediate-level courts from circumscribing trial court discretion in the application of
an open-ended legal norm. Deferential review accomplishes this result in a retrospective
manner; it limits the extent to which reviewing courts can upset lower court judgments that have
already been rendered. Rules against rulification accomplish the result prospectively; they limit
the extent to which reviewing courts can constrain trial courts’ application of a standard by
imposing rules for future cases. Mandatory standards thus prevent reviewing courts from
achieving in an ex ante fashion the same sorts of incursions on trial-court autonomy that
deferential review standards aim to discourage ex post.
There remains a final difference between mandatory standards and permissive standards
in terms of their delegation-related effects. Mandatory standards, as we have seen, delegate
decisional authority all the way to the bottom of the legal hierarchy. Permissive standards, by
contrast, delegate decisional authority to intermediate-level courts. But notice that only
permissive standards permit the delegee to redelegate. From the Court’s refusal to adopt an antirulification rule, it does not follow that an intermediate court must issue rules that constrain the
trial courts’ application of the standard. The intermediate court might instead decide that the
standard makes sense as articulated by the Supreme Court, and that no further rulification is
necessary. Having so decided, the intermediate court would effectively delegate its own
decisional authority down to the courts below it: rather than choose to provide further guidance
to the lower courts in the form of rule-like specifications of a standard, it would allow the lower
courts to take up the laboring oar for themselves. Thus, while I earlier noted that permissive
standards transmit decisional authority to intermediate-level courts, it is perhaps more accurate to
say that permissive standards leave open the ultimate question of where in the judicial hierarchy
such decisional authority will vest. Mandatory standards, by contrast, cut the intermediate courts
out of the lawmaking loop.
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C.
Deliberation
One of the oft-cited benefits of standards over rules is that standards (unlike rules)
demand serious and continuous judicial engagement with the law.108 From this perspective, the
mechanistic nature of rule-application counts as a minus rather than a plus. The applier of a rule
need only determine whether its triggering conditions are present (e.g., the driver did or did not
exceed 65 mph) and resolve the case accordingly (e.g., the driver did or did not break the law).
The applier of a standard, by contrast, has to wade deeply into the underlying dispute (e.g., what
is it about this driver’s conduct that makes us think it was reasonable or unreasonable?). This
sort of engagement can benefit both the court and its audience in a variety of ways. Among
other things, it works against calcification and obsolescence in the face of changing factual
circumstances, it can improve judges’ understanding of a recurring doctrinal problem, and it can
promote useful debate and dialogue regarding the purposes, scope, and soundness of the standard
itself. Courts, in short, are more likely to explore and explain what the law is about when
applying standards as opposed to rules, and these explorations and explanations can benefit the
substance of the law itself.
How do deliberation values affect the choice between mandatory and permissive
standards? On the one hand, anti-rulification rules safeguard deliberation values by stultifying a
standard’s gradual evolution into a rule. Lower court judges cannot specify the substance of a
mandatory standard in crisp, generally-applicable terms, which means that mandatory standards
stand a better chance of remaining standard-like (and accordingly deliberation-inducing) as time
moves forward. On the other hand, permissive standards may promote richer and more robust
forms of deliberation, especially over the short term. With mandatory standards, certain types of
reasoning are effectively off-limits; courts must take care, for instance, not to rely too much on
generalizations and presumptions applied across cases, lest their doing so push the operative law
too far away from the individualized, case-by-case analysis that the mandatory standard requires.
Recall what happened in Florida v. Harris. In setting forth the “rigid evidentiary
checklist” that the Supreme Court rejected, the Florida Supreme Court sought to shed light on a
set of recurring problems presented by canine searches. The state court expressed concern, for
instance, about the absence of a uniform certification standard for drug-sniffing dogs, inadequate
record-keeping procedures regarding the success rates of their searches, and—to the extent that
such records existed—defendants’ difficulties in accessing them.109 These deficiencies, the state
court concluded, not only placed an unfair burden on the defendant in Harris, but would
continue to place such burdens on similarly-situated defendants in future cases. By fixing
attention on these matters, however, the state court could not help but reduce the degree to which
future applications of the Gates test would permit a “flexible” and “all-things-considered”
analysis. The court was, after all, tipping its hand as to the sorts of evidentiary deficiencies it
would deem to be of central importance in future cases. And so, subordinate courts in Florida
received a telling message as to what sorts of sniffs by what sorts of dogs would withstand
down-the-line constitutional attack. To be sure, the Florida court need not have gone as far as it
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did; it could have discussed all of these issues without taking the additional step of adopting
formal prerequisites for the government to satisfy in every future case. But even if it had not
taken that additional step, its focus on a limited category of the attributes of sniff searches was
designed to channel the reasoning of lower courts in a way that Harris undertook to foreclose.
To be sure, courts might sometimes deliberate best by focusing narrowly on the case
before them, resisting the inclination to consider broader regulatory issues that its fact pattern
might raise. In Harris, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court might justifiably have worried
that—in attempting to think generally about problems presented by sniff-search probable cause
review—the state court would deprive future sniff-search litigants the fact-sensitive attentiveness
they deserve. But there’s undoubtedly a deliberation-related cost to the sort of case-by-case,
totality-of-the-circumstances review that anti-rulification rules require. When lower courts must
refrain from looking beyond the individual facts of a case, important aspects of a doctrinal
problem may escape their notice. A mandatory standard, in short, may guarantee case-by-case
deliberation over the long haul, but—by insisting on case-by-case applications of unspecified
standards—it may guarantee forms of deliberation that are unduly myopic.
D.
Transparency
A final potential downside to mandatory standards relates to the transparency of lowercourt decisionmaking. Judges who confront a recurrent fact pattern may come to rely upon
hidden rules of thumb to govern their implementation of an open-ended legal norm. (For
example, if the driver was exceeding 65 mph, a judge might always rule that his driving was
unreasonable; if the dog was not certified by this or that agency, a judge might always regard its
alerts as unreliable; etc.). But if the standard is mandatory, the judge has no reason to reveal—
and indeed, a strong reason not to reveal—the existence of the rules of thumb on which she
relies. Put another way, rather than deter lower courts from relying on rules, mandatory
standards may serve only to push judicial reliance on rules behind closed doors. And that in turn
means more confusion and less accountability within the law.
This last point, to be clear, should not count as a dispositive factor against adopting an
anti-rulification rule. Many dubious factors can and probably do influence lower court
deliberation, even in the face of Supreme Court commands to the contrary.110 That such factors
carry influence, however, does mean that the Court must resign itself to their existence. Thus,
when the Court has concluded that the rule-based implementation of a standard would take the
doctrine in a bad direction, it should instruct the lower courts not to rulify, even if some lower
courts might subversively employ hidden rules of thumb. (After all, not all lower courts will
ignore the Supreme Court’s direction, and at least a high court declaration of a rule against
rulification will push against widespread deployment of either open or clandestine rules of
thumb.) On the other hand, if the case against rulification is weaker, and/or the lower courts will
face particularly powerful temptations to rulify, transparency concerns could tip the scale in
favor of permissive standards. Under these circumstances, the benefits to be derived from an
anti-rulification are not likely to outweigh the costs of creating a disconnect between doctrinal
rhetoric and decisional reality.
E.
Conclusion: Minimalism Redux?
There is a thematic unity to the various problems I have discussed in this Section. Each
of these problems, in one way or another, relates to an overarching concern that anti-rulification
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rules can close off space that would better be left open for further doctrinal development—such
rules, in other words, may decide too much too soon. Considerations related to lower court
experimentation, the dispersion of decision-making authority, the inducement of deliberation,
and the promotion of judicial transparency will often favor decisional approaches that, in
Professor Sunstein’s words, are “catalytic rather than preclusive”—apt to spur more, rather than
less, investigation, experimentation, and debate regarding the appropriate architecture of judicial
doctrine.111 But anti-rulification rules often work against such outcomes.
The anti-minimalist streak of anti-rulification rules raises two final points regarding their
desirability. First, given the substantial tension between the priorities of minimalists and the
effects of anti-rulification rules, I suspect that one’s overall attitude towards minimalism will
operate as a reasonably reliable proxy for one’s overall attitude towards the project of prohibiting
down-the-road rulification of Supreme Court standards. The ardent minimalist should find much
to fear in rules against rulification, whereas the milquetoast minimalist (and especially the ardent
maximalist) will not be much moved by the foregoing critiques. If nothing else, I hope that my
analysis has made this point clear: Minimalists in particular ought to view anti-rulification rules
with a healthy degree of skepticism.
The second point stems from the first. Legal commentators have often drawn a quick
association between minimalist judging and standard-based judging. As Professor Sunstein
himself has put it, “[a] preference for minimalism is very close, analytically, to a preference for
standards over rules.”112 The analysis I have offered here suggests an important qualification to
this assertion—namely, that minimalist-based judging maps onto standard-based judging only
insofar as the standards at issue are permissive rather than mandatory. In other words, a
minimalist ought view the mere enunciation of a standard for now quite differently from the
outright imposition of that standard as a lodestar for future cases. The latter sort of decision is, in
my view, not significantly less maximalist than a decision imposing a first-order rule. Both of
these moves are maximalist because they push toward definitive doctrinal solutions for here and
everafter, rather than provisional solutions, amenable to further tinkering (if not outright
rethinking) in the lower courts and the Supreme Court itself.
This observation may seem counterintuitive at first: If plain-vanilla standards promote
minimalism, should not mandated standards promote it even more effectively? In fact, however,
the maximalist nature of anti-rulification rules is easy to reconcile with the basic observation that
(permissive) standards and minimalism go well together. Rules against rulification, after all, are
rules themselves. And just as substantive, first-order rules foreclose experimentation,
deliberation, and delegation in the project of defining the proper scope of a legal norm, so too do
second-order methodological rules (such as rules against rulification) foreclose experimentation,
deliberation, and delegation in identifying the proper means of applying that norm across cases.
True, an anti-rulification rule commands the use of standards, and standards themselves are
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friendly to the minimalist cause. But standards are friendly to the minimalist cause largely
because they leave the law open for further elaboration in subsequent cases. By categorically
precluding standards from accomplishing that result, rules against rulification end up
undermining the decisional virtues of minimalism in much the same way that any other set of
rules might do so.
IV.
WORKING WITH ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES
The previous Part identified several problems that might arise from the adoption of a rule
against rulification. Putting such problems on the table, however, is different from declaring that
anti-rulification rules should never be used. And nothing I have said thus far should be taken to
suggest that courts never ought to issue rules against rulification. Sometimes the benefits of such
rules will outweigh their costs: Thus, when the Court determines that an area of law is best
served by standard-based decisionmaking, rules against rulification help to ensure that future
decisions will embrace this approach. Determining when such a decision is appropriate,
however, is a complicated and context-dependent task. While I cannot offer a straightforward
rubric for determining when and when not to implement rules against rulification, I do hope to
have laid on the table the considerations that should guide the decision.
But let us now turn to a second set of issues, which involve not the question of whether to
adopt anti-rulification, but rather how to deal with anti-rulification rules once the decision to
adopt them has been made. Section A offers some preliminary thoughts on how the Supreme
Court should go about articulating rules against rulification within its own decisions. Section B
then turns to the lower courts’ task of detecting such rules, asking in particular how lower courts
should interpret mixed signals from the Court about the presence of anti-rulification rules and
whether the courts may permissibly regard even clearly stated anti-rulification rules as nonbinding dicta.
A.
Creating Anti-Rulification Rules
1.
Separating Substance from Methodology
The Court often announces an anti-rulification rule while reviewing a lower court’s effort
to rulify a standard. (In Harris, for instance, the Court reviewed a Florida Supreme Court
decision that had established, in the Court’s words, a “strict evidentiary checklist” for
establishing requisite level of reliability for drug-detection dogs.113) But simply invalidating one
rulification in particular will not suffice to create a general rule against rulification. Absent
further explanation, such a holding would merely establish that the lower court erred by rulifying
the standard in the way it did. And such a holding in its nature does not stand for the broader
proposition that all other attempts at rulifying the standard are similarly invalid. Standards can
be rulified in many ways. Deeming one such rulification inappropriate is not the same as
prohibiting rulification across the board.
Thus, in setting forth a rule against rulification, the Court must take care to disaggregate
its substantive evaluation of a particular rulification from its methodological evaluation of
whether a standard may ever be rulified. This the Court does not always do, as Harris itself
reveals. Some portions of the Court’s opinion criticized the Florida Supreme Court for failing to
evaluate the probable-cause question on a flexible, case-by-case basis.114 Other portions of the
opinion, however, criticized the substance of the particular evidentiary checklist that the Florida
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court had devised.115 Logically, these lines of argument point to different conclusions. If the
problem with the Florida court’s opinion lay in its rulifying methodology, then the adequacy of
the checklist should have been irrelevant to the determination and the Court could have reversed
by relying on Gates without more. If, by contrast, the problem with the Florida court’s opinion
stemmed from the substance of the checklist itself, then the Court should have reversed, while
making clear that other lower courts remained free to experiment with other sorts of evidentiary
checklists (or alternative rulifications of the Gates standard) in future cases. Under no
circumstances, however, should it have followed from the substantive inadequacy of the Florida
court’s checklist that all future assessments of a dog sniff’s reliability must eschew reliance on
determinate rules.116
There is another point too. It may well be that the most effective vehicles for establishing
anti-rulification rules will be cases—unlike Harris—in which the particular rulifications at issue
do not strike the Court as egregiously off-base. If the Court really wishes to convince us that a
given standard should never be rulified, it should focus on the best possible attempts at
rulification, rather than highlight defects in the obviously misguided ones. Consider, for
instance, the Court’s discussion of the Patent Act’s “nonobviousness” requirement in KSR
International v. Teleflex, Inc.117 There, the Federal Circuit had developed a “teaching,
suggestions, and motivations” (“TSM”) test for evaluating the obviousness of combination-based
inventions. In stark contrast to Harris, where the Court went out of its way to criticize several
substantive assumptions underlying the lower court’s attempted rulification of the Gates
standard, the KSR opinion actually endorsed the intuitions underlying the lower court’s TSM
test. The test, the Court emphasized, had “captured a helpful insight”; among other things, the it
reflected the common-sense principle that “it can be important to identify a reason that would
have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way
the claimed new invention does.”118 But even helpful insights, the Court went onto explain,
could not justify the adoption of “rigid and mandatory formulas,” which threatened to reduce the
obviousness analysis to “a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and
motivation.”119 Having endorsed the substantive thrust of the test, the Court could more easily
demonstrate why the “[r]igid preventative rules” that emerged from the test were not good—
why, that is, such rules threatened to “deny factfinders recourse to common sense” in evaluating
obviousness claims.120 By steering its focus away from the substantive underpinnings of the
TSM test, and focusing more on the rigidity of the test itself, the Court in KSR International
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Id. at 1056-57 (criticizing the Florida Court’s reliance on field data, which “may markedly overstate a dog’s real
false positives,” and contending that “[t]he better measure of a dog’s reliability thus comes away from the field, in
controlled testing environments”).
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could offer a more focused and persuasive justification for its methodological prohibition on
rulifying the obviousness standard.121
2.
Practicing What One Preaches
A second guiding principle for the creation of anti-rulification rules may seem selfevident. Once the Court has prohibited rulification of a standard, it should abide by its own
proscription. In this respect, too, the Court’s opinion in Harris fell flat. Having upbraided the
Florida Supreme Court for relying on an “evidentiary checklist” to guide its own standards for
canine reliability review, the Court went on to prescribe what reads much like an evidentiary
checklist of its own. Consider some of the guidance the Court offered regarding the proper way
to conduct a dog-sniffing probable cause inquiry (which, for dramatic effect, I present in quasichecklist format):
• “[T]he decision below treats records of a dog’s field performance as the gold standard
in evidence, when in most cases they have relatively limited import.”122
•

“The better measure of a dog’s reliability thus comes away from the field, in
controlled testing environments.”123

•

“[E]vidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training
program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert.”124

•

“The same is true, even in the absence of formal certification, if the dog has
recently and successfully completed a training program that evaluated his
proficiency in locating drugs.”125

•

“A defendant, however, must have an opportunity to challenge such evidence of a
dog’s reliability, whether by cross-examining the testifying officer or by
introducing his own fact or expert witness.”126

•

“If the State has produced proof from controlled settings that a dog performs
reliably in detecting drugs, and the defendant has not contested that showing, then
the court should find probable cause.”127
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This is, to be clear, not a distinction I wish to overdraw. The boundary between substance and methodology is,
much like the boundary between substance and procedure, not always easy to draw. Arguably, some of the KSR
Court’s criticisms of the Federal Circuit’s analysis went as much to the “substance” of the TSM test as they did to
the rule-like nature of the test. See, e.g., id. at 421 (criticizing the TSM test as reflecting an unduly pessimistic view
of judges’ susceptibility to hindsight bias in evaluating obviousness claims). Even so, KSR did take pains to suggest
that basic underlying insights of the TSM test were valid and worth attending to, whereas Harris took pains to
suggest that the Florida Supreme Court’s evidentiary checklist suffered from a bevy of erroneous premises. If the
purpose of the decision is to establish a general rule against rulification, applicable across the whole range of
potential rulifications that a lower court might derive, then a KSR-type analysis, which identifies problems with
rulification even in the presence of a pretty decent substantive rule, is more likely to be satisfactory.
122
Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056.
123
Id. at 1057.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 1058.

34

In fairness to the Court, none of these prescriptions absolutely requires that future
assessors of dog reliability accord dispositive weight to one or another type of evidence.128 But
these and other statements from Harris set forth a surprisingly specific framework for evaluating
such reliability in future cases, thus complicating lower courts’ ability to apply the probable
cause standard in the “fluid” and “flexible” manner that Harris seemed to demand.129 Having
called for the pure application of an unrulified standard to the facts of each case, the Court
muddied the waters of its own methodological directive, by identifying several general,
seemingly non-totalistic principles that all such applications must honor.130
Consider, for instance, the post-Harris plight of a lower court asked to render a reliability
determination vis-à-vis a dog that has been certified by a newly established and highly reputed
training agency. The court might wish to establish, as a general rule, that certification by the
agency is per se sufficient to establish a dog’s reliability. Can it so hold? On the one hand,
doing so seems consistent with (if not expressly required by) the Harris Court’s suggestion that
“[E]vidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself
provide sufficient reason to trust his alert.”131 On the other hand, such a holding would seem to
establish the very sort of “bright-line rule” that Harris explicitly eschewed. In short, the lower
court faces a Catch-22: It may accord the agency’s certification non-dispositive weight and
thereby invite reversal on the ground that it undervalued a type of evidence that Harris deemed
to be critically important. Or, it may treat the agency’s certification as dispositive and thereby
invite reversal on the ground that it was “prescrib[ing] . . . an inflexible set of evidentiary
requirements.”132 Acting one way would ignore Harris’s substantive guidance regarding
credible evidence of sniff-search reliability; acting the other way would violate its antirulification rule.
In all likelihood, Harris did not quite mean what it said. The point of Harris was not that
lower courts must eschew presumptions and generalizations altogether, but rather that they
should go no further with these presumptions and generalizations than the Court has told them to
go. Harris thus accomplishes a partial rulification of the probable cause inquiry, while also
suggesting that lower courts should not move that inquiry any farther toward the rule end of the
spectrum. There is nothing illogical in such a holding; the Court can cogently instruct its
subordinates to establish this much ex ante guidance, but not any more. To the extent that this is
the true holding of Harris, however, it is a holding at odds with the anti-rulification language that
permeates the opinion itself. The true import of the decision would have been easier to discern if
the Court either had toned down its rhetoric regarding the “fluid” and “common sense” nature of
probable cause review or had refrained from giving such detailed guidance regarding future
applications of the probable cause standard.
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B.

Detecting Anti-Rulification Rules
1.
Thresholds of Clarity
What about the role of lower courts in determining whether they are bound by antirulification rules? As we saw from Part II, the Supreme Court does not always speak with clarity
regarding the methodological obligations it wishes to impose on the courts below. One
difficulty, as we have seen, is the occasional opinion that blends together substantive and
methodological critiques: when the Supreme Court attacks a lower court’s rulification of a
standard, does it intend to wipe out all such rulifications of that standard, or merely the particular
rulification that the lower court used? Further difficulties arise when, as in Harris, the Court
condemns rulification with one hand while engaging in rulification with the other. And most
commonly, the Court is often unclear as to whether it is merely defending its own choice to
adopt a standard or taking the further step of prohibiting rulification of the standard in future
cases. In these and other ways, the Supreme Court can generate uncertainty regarding the
existence of an anti-rulification rule. And in the face of such uncertainty, the question arises:
What should lower courts do?
Consider, for instance, the law of personal jurisdiction. When the Court first set forth its
“minimum contacts” standard for personal jurisdiction analysis, it characterized the inquiry as
one that could not “be simply mechanical or quantitative,” but rather must “depend . . . upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” 133 This language—along with
other statements from the Court’s personal jurisdiction case law134—has led some lower courts to
resist adopting rules to facilitate their own application of International Shoe and its progeny.
These courts, in other words, felt bound not only by the substance of the minimum contacts
standard, but also by what they saw as the Supreme Court’s methodological preference for
standards over rules within the context of personal jurisdiction analysis.135 But if you go back
and peruse the relevant case law, you won’t find the Court ever issuing a direct edict of the sort it
133
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issued in the case law I discussed in Part II—insisting, in other words, that lower courts apply
the minimum contacts standard in a way that proceeds case-by-case and takes into account the
totality of the circumstances. Rather, International Shoe’s warnings about mechanistic and
quantitative decision-making addressed the issue of what sort of substantive inquiry the Court
itself should adopt for purposes of establishing guiding principles of minimum contacts analysis.
But what works best for the Court in denoting first-order doctrinal principles of personal
jurisdiction doctrine may not work best for subordinate courts tasked with translating those
principles into on-the-ground results. Put another way, one reason why the Court might wish to
decline adopting a “mechanical or quantitative” test is precisely because such a test would reduce
lower courts’ freedom to shape the personal jurisdiction inquiry in whatever manner they see fit.
So, International Shoe and its progeny could be read as simply offering a justification for the
Court’s choice of a standard over a rule, rather than an explicit instruction that the standard, once
adopted, may not be rulified in future cases.
How should lower courts resolve uncertainties of this sort? In my view, they should
apply a strong presumption against anti-rulification rules, agreeing to adhere to such rules only
when the Court has established them with crystal clarity. In part, that preference derives from
the benefits of permissive standard that I have identified in Part III. Given these benefits, I
would rather that lower courts—and especially intermediate-level courts of appeals—retain
freedom to work through difficult doctrinal problems with toolkits that include the power to
rulify.
Whatever the intrinsic merits of anti-rulification rules, however, there is an additional
reason to treat them as non-existent until proven otherwise. This reason stems from the
“information-forcing” benefits that such a presumption would produce.136 Simply put, where a
lower court seeks further guidance from the Supreme Court regarding the existence of an antirulification rule, it is more likely to receive that guidance by assuming for now that no such rule
exists.
To see why, suppose that all the lower courts treated an area of case law—for instance,
the Court’s personal jurisdiction case law—as establishing a rule against rulification. Going
forward, the lower courts would apply the minimum contacts standard in a narrow, fact-specific
manner, issuing opinions that did not venture far beyond the unique circumstances of each case.
That, in turn, would render the lower courts less likely to produce opinions that attracted the
Supreme Court’s attention. They would sometimes err in applying the standard too leniently or
too strictly, but the consequences of their errors would be relatively minor, owing to the highly
fact-specific nature of the opinions in which the errors occurred. If, by contrast, the lower courts
painted broadly—that is, they issued specific and widely applicable directives regarding the
application of the minimum contacts test—their decisions would be more likely to arouse the
interest of the Court itself and thus generate clarifying guidance as to whether a rule against
rulification does in fact exist.
2.
Dicta Versus Holding?
Even if Supreme Court precedent establishes an anti-rulification rule with absolute
clarity, lower courts might remain tempted to dismiss such a rule as “dicta” rather than
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“holding.” The dicta/holding distinction defies easy definition,137 but, in simplified form, it rests
on the idea that pronouncements of law underpinning the actual result of a case are different
from pronouncements of law that merely accompany the result. Only the former sorts of
propositions, longstanding convention holds, constitute binding authority subject to both
horizontal and vertical stare decisis. Extracurricular ponderings about the law—not necessary to
the outcome of a case—may be treated as persuasive authority, but nothing more.
Might anti-rulification rules qualify as non-binding dicta? Certainly, we can imagine
cases where the answer is “yes.” If, say, the Court were to opine on the standard-based nature of
the eBay four-factor test in a case having nothing to do with a request for injunctive relief, then
its discussion of eBay would count as non-binding dicta under even the narrowest definitions of
the term. But more difficult questions emerge in cases of the sort we examined in Part II, where
the Court reverses the lower court on the ground that it erroneously relied on a rule to facilitate
its application of a standard. Arguably, anti-rulification rules might still qualify as dicta in these
circumstances, on the theory that only the Court’s objection to the particular rulification at issue
in the case is necessary to the outcome of that case. On this understanding, for instance, the
Court’s analysis in Harris yielded a holding only insofar as it rejected the particular “evidentiary
checklist” that the Florida Supreme Court employed. Its broader insistence that no rulifications
should ever attend sniff-search reliability evaluations was not needed to reach that result:
whatever the Court’s feelings about alternative lower-court rulifications in other cases, the
invalidity of the Florida court’s checklist was itself sufficient to doom the decision below. And
more generally, the argument goes, globally applicable anti-rulification rules will always count
as dicta as long as they prove broader than necessary to justify the Court’s invalidation of one
and only one means of rulifying a standard.
This line of reasoning proves too much. It would suggest that all Supreme Court rules
(whether or not about rulification) count as dicta rather than holding, since all rules purport to
decide more than the particular case that accompanies their announcement. Analogous
reasoning, for instance, would hold that the prophylactic rule adopted in Miranda was nonbinding dicta, on the theory that a detailed description of how police officers should warn
suspects in future cases was not necessary to the Court’s holding that the particular warning
before it violated the law. But no one treats Miranda’s requirements as dicta; rather, everyone
treats the Miranda warning as stemming from a binding holding of the case. And that is true of
many rules that the Court has adopted; lower courts adhere to the rule, even though the rule
decides more than the particular case from which it emerged.
An alternative attempt to classify anti-rulification rules as dicta might emphasize their
methodological character. Stare decisis norms, this argument would go, typically apply to firstorder dictates of law and not to second-order rules about crafting the dictates themselves. Along
these lines, as several legislation scholars have noted, lower courts typically do not treat the
Supreme Court’s preferred methods of statutory interpretation as carrying stare decisis effect.
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For instance, even if the Supreme Court has eschewed reliance on legislative history when
interpreting some statute, lower courts may still consult legislative history in interpreting the
same law.138 And if that is true regarding methods of statutory interpretation, should it not also
be true regarding the methods of law application as well?
This argument, however, conflates two different questions: (1) whether the Court does
accord stare decisis effect to its methodological rules; and (2) whether the Court may in fact do
so. The curiosity regarding methodologies of statutory interpretation arises from the Court’s
general refusal to enter the precedential fray, not from any sort of widespread understanding that
the Court would be powerless to create binding rules of interpretive methodology if it so desired.
In fact, as Professor Abbe Gluck has pointed out, the Court routinely assigns binding
precedential status to a wide range of methodological rules outside the statutory interpretation
context, including “Title VII’s burden-shifting regime, the rules of federal contract interpretation,
federal choice-of-law rules, interpretive regimes for admiralty, and so on.” 139 Moreover, lower
courts do not bat an eye at the idea that they must treat such rules as binding precedent. Rules
against rulification, which the Court characterizes as binding on the courts below, are no
different. If common practice is a guide, then—pace the unusual case of statutory
interpretation—the methodological character of anti-rulification rules is not likely to deprive
them of binding effect.140
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V.

VARIATIONS ON THE THEME
Rules against rulification represent the primary means by which the Supreme Court
constrains the method of applying and implementing its precedents in subsequent cases. Might
there be other means of imposing such methodological constraints? I here consider three such
alternative devices—devices that, to the best of my knowledge, the Court has never explicitly
employed, but that, like rules against rulification, might restrict (or direct) methodological
choices in helpful and productive ways. First, I consider the possibility of “pro-rulification
rules,” which would expressly instruct the lower courts to rulify standards that the Supreme
Court itself has settled on. Second, I consider the possibility of “anti-rulification standards,”
which discourage but not outright prohibit lower-court rulification. Finally, I consider the
possibility of “anti-publication rules,” which would prohibit lower courts from issuing published
opinions (and hence creating binding precedents) in connection with a particular standard the
Court has created.
A.
Pro-Rulification Rules
In Part III, we saw that there exist a variety of reasons why the Court might wish not to
create a rule against rulification. One such reason relates to the value of lower court
experimentation; in particular, when the Court envisions that it might one day offer specific
guidance regarding the application of a legal norm, but is not yet sure as to what that guidance
will be, the best course of action might be to issue a permissive standard for now and to see what
the lower courts come up with. Under these circumstances, an anti-rulification rule would prove
counterproductive, on the theory that prohibiting lower court rulification would defeat the
purpose of adopting the standard itself.
If the Court really wished to examine the fruits of lower court rulification processes
before settling on its own rule-like formulation of a standard, perhaps it should do more than
simply not prohibit lower courts from rulifying. Maybe, that is, the court should affirmatively
require lower courts to do just that.
For a rough analogue to this idea, consider the Court’s discussion of Article III standing
doctrine in Allen v. Wright.141 There, in discussing the “injury-in-fact” requirement, the Court
conceded that the requirement “cannot be defined so as to make application of the constitutional
standing requirement a mechanical exercise.”142 At the same time, however, the Court went on
to note that “[t]he absence of precise definitions . . . hardly leaves courts at sea in applying the
law of standing.”143 Why? Because Article III standing “is built on a single basic idea—the idea
of separation of powers” and “both federal and state courts have long experience in applying and
elaborating in numerous contexts the pervasive and fundamental notion of separation of
run afoul of its commands, provides reason enough for lower courts to resist rulification when the Supreme Court
has expressly instructed them to do so. See David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in
Lower Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2049-50 (2013) (concluding, on the basis of
empirical study, that “lower courts very rarely invoke the holding-dictum distinction to reach decisions at odds with
higher court dicta”). That point seems sufficient as a descriptive matter, and perhaps also enough as a normative
matter, to support the proposition that anti-rulification rules, once clearly established, carry binding precedential
force. See id. at 2048 (noting that “there is a strong argument to be made that theory entirely divorced from practice
can have only limited utility, especially insofar as it is aimed at lawyers in training or practice and is meant not only
to identify normative ideals but also to help clarify thinking about how law operates”).
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powers.”144 Put somewhat differently, subsequent clarification of the doctrine might occur in the
lower courts themselves, since “[d]etermining standing in a particular case may be facilitated by
clarifying principles or even clear rules developed in prior cases.”145 This was, to be sure, not
always going to be possible; many issues of Article III standing would always require “careful
judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations.”146 But, given the overarching separation-ofpowers principles at play, and given the lower courts’ ability to flesh out the contours of these
principles through the common law method, the Court saw an opportunity for “the gradual
clarification of the law through judicial application.”147
To be sure, this language hardly obligated lower courts to start developing clarifying
rules regarding the scope of the injury-in-fact requirement. Perhaps the Court intended merely to
assuage fears that a vaguely formulated injury-in-fact requirement presaged eternal doctrinal
confusion. But one at least sees within the passage the seeds for what might be a new, and
sometimes useful technique for developing the contours of the law in an especially inclusive and
dialogic way: create a standard at the Supreme Court level and then expressly invite (if not
outright obligate) the lower courts to develop rules about the standard in subsequent cases.
Insofar as greater clarity and specificity of the doctrine are the overarching desiderata, and
insofar as the Court seeks lower court input on how the doctrine should be clarified and
specified, then a “pro-rulification rule” might best serve the interests of the Court itself.
B.
Anti-Rulification Standards
Anti-rulification rules, I have argued, can suffer on account of their rule-like nature.
They categorically render rulification off-limits, leaving minimal room for future discretion in
determining whether the process should take place. When the absolutism of an anti-rulification
threatens to do harm, one possible corrective is to reduce its absoluteness. Rather than prohibit
rulification outright, the Court might simply issue a non-categorical caution against rulifying,
while still permitting the practice to proceed when exceptional circumstances so warrant.
I would term such a directive a “standard against rulification.” One can imagine various
forms that such a standard would assume. The Court might hold, for instance, that lower courts
may not rulify unless doing so is “absolutely necessary to constrain trial court decisionmaking.”
Or, it might provide that lower courts may rulify, but only in a way that “maintains an adequate
degree of fit between the purpose of the norm and the outcomes that it generates.” And so forth.
The idea, in short, would be to place a thumb on the scale against rulification without banning
the practice outright.
Again, I am unaware of any holdings that follow directly along these lines.148 In practice,
though, a standard against rulification might not operate all that differently from Supreme Court
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doctrines that leave the existence of an anti-rulification rule unclear.149 And these sorts of
doctrines, as we saw in the previous Part, do indeed exist. In these areas of doctrine, recall,
uncertainty arises not from a deliberate choice on the part of the Court to vest some measure of
rulification discretion in the courts below. Rather, the issue is whether, in justifying its own
decision to adopt a rule over a standard, the Court has (intentionally or not) directed its
subordinates to follow suit when applying that standard to future cases. This difference aside,
however, the upshot of both sorts of decisions is the same. When the Court sends mixed signals
about the existence of anti-rulification rule, lower courts may feel some, but not total, pressure to
avoid rulifying the standard, much as they would do in the face of an express directive from the
Court instructing them, say, to avoid rulifying unless absolutely necessary.
As compared to a debatably existent rule against rulification, however, a standard against
rulification is more likely to yield manageable and satisfactory forms of lower court discretion.
For one thing, if a lower court determines that uncertain precedents do in fact create an antirulification rule, then, within that court’s jurisdiction at least, rulifying discretion totally and
completely disappears. With an anti-rulification standard, by contrast, all intermediate courts
may proceed with the knowledge that rulification might be appropriate under some
circumstances. In addition, standards against rulification better enable the Court to identify the
conditions under which rulification may take place. If the only source of lower court discretion
is doctrinal confusion regarding the presence of an anti-rulification rule, then the lower courts
may leverage that confusion to steer their case law in unanticipated and undesirable directions.
If, by contrast, the source of lower court discretion is a direct vesting of such discretion by the
Court itself, then the Court can more effectively channel that discretion in the direction it wants
it to go.
C.
Anti-Publication Rules
Thus far, we have explored alternatives to anti-rulification rules that are friendlier to the
development of rule-based doctrines in the lower courts. Here, by contrast, I consider a final
possibility that, in my view, would deter rulification even more effectively than anti-rulification
rules themselves. As we have previously seen,150 even with anti-rulification rules in place, the
accretion of precedents over time will tend to increase the specificity of legal doctrine. Antirulification rules slow down this process, but at the end of the day, even the most categorical
rules against rulification cannot stop rulification from occurring at all. Today’s decisions
become tomorrow’s precedents. And with enough precedents on the books, application of even
mandatory standards will be far more constrained and far less holistic than the Court might wish
for it to be.
Would the Court be able to stave off even these very gradual processes of rulification that
anti-rulification rules are powerless to stop? In theory, yes. If gradual rulification inevitably
results from precedential decision-making, the Court could nip it in the bud by prohibiting
precedential opinions. Most federal courts of appeals regularly issue unpublished opinions,
which carry minimal, if any, precedential weight. This practice is highly controversial: among
other things, nonprecedential opinions (called summary orders in some circuits) have been
criticized as unconstitutional,151 unwise,152 and unfair to the parties they bind.153 But whatever
149

See Part V infra.
See Part I.C infra.
151
See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a circuit rule according
nonprecedential effect to unpublished opinions violate[d] Article III “because it purports to confer on the federal
150

42

their flaws, unpublished opinions do provide a means of resolving cases in the present without
constraining the resolution of cases in the future.154 And thus, if the Court were really serious
about guaranteeing that each case arising under a standard enjoys case-by-case, holistic, and
common-sensical review, then prohibiting the publication of opinions in these cases would prove
an especially potent means of achieving that result.
Many readers, I suspect, would blanch at this proposal. Wholly apart from its potential
illegality, the promulgation of anti-publication rules would seem an especially meddlesome and
heavy-handed move for the Court to make. Why should the lower courts be told how to handle
their own business? Can’t they figure out for themselves whether or not to issue a precedential
opinion in a given case? Or, put somewhat differently, wouldn’t anti-publication rules severely
impair lower courts’ abilities to develop and elaborate on Supreme Court precedents in useful
and beneficial ways?
You can probably see where I am going with this. If rules against publication strike you
as absurd, then rules against rulification ought at least to strike you as problematic. Antipublication rules, after all, would amount to nothing more than anti-rulification rules in a superstrong form. Whereas anti-rulification rules limit a lower court’s power to make law for itself,
anti-publication rules would totally destroy it. Thus, many of our objections to rules against
publication would apply to rules against rulification as well, albeit in somewhat muted form.
The judicial system derives value from letting lower courts make law about what Supreme Court
standards entail. And for the same reasons that anti-publication rules would eliminate that value,
anti-rulification rules would substantially reduce it.
CONCLUSION
Any system of adjudication must reconcile two basic tasks. The first is resolving
individual cases, the second is the task of shaping and enunciating controlling norms of law.
These two tasks, as many commentators have noted, rest in uneasy repose. Efforts to ensure the
fair and just resolution of cases often come at the expense of promoting the sound development
of the law, and vice versa. What is good for the parties to a particular dispute may be bad for the
doctrine writ large; what is good for the doctrine writ large may be bad for the parties to a
particular dispute. Many classic disputes over the judge’s role boil down to this basic tradeoff:
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To what extent should courts act as the mere resolvers of disputes, and to what extent should
they act as active shapers of the law?155
The questions examined in this Article implicate this tension between the disputeresolution and law-formulation models of judicial work. Those who emphasize the dispute
resolution model should find much to like in anti-rulification rules, which help to ensure
comprehensive, holistic, and commonsensical judicial deliberation about each case that makes its
way through the legal system. Those who favor the law declaration model, meanwhile, should
find much to dislike in anti-rulification rules, whose very attempts to realize fairness at the retail
level may frustrate courts’ efforts to develop workable and effective doctrine at the wholesale
level. And that is so, we have seen, because prohibiting the rulification of standards means
inhibiting beneficial forms of thinking about and tinkering with the substance of the law itself.
Additional complexities, to be sure, might underlie this basic proposition. But the parallels
nonetheless strike me as important and real. Simply put, mandatory standards reflect the values
of the dispute-resolver, whereas permissive standards reflect the values of the law-declarer.
The irony remains, though, that rules against rulification are rules—reflecting, in other
words, the law-declarer’s command that dispute-resolution matters most. That may seem
inherently contradictory, though it need not be so. If one believes that only the Supreme Court
should function as the exclusive developer of law within the judicial system, then it makes
perfect sense for the Court to exert its law-developing authority in a manner that ensures fair and
faithful dispute resolution in the courts below. But insofar as one rejects this vision of the
federal judiciary—as I do—then rules against rulification are not so easily justified. That is not
to say they have no place in a judicial system in which all courts have some say over the scope
and substance of legal norms. But if the vision of our system is a collaborative one, in which the
Supreme Court leads but does not go it alone in developing the law, then the Court should at
least take care to promulgate its rules against rulification with due attention to the lawdeclaration downsides that they bring.
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